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These papers are a product of the South Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Unit. They are part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research 
and make a contribution to development policy discussions in Pakistan and around the 
world. Policy Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
authors may be contacted at drobalino@worldbank.org and ycho1@worldbank.org. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Policy Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage 
the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the 
findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry 
the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily 
represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World 
Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank 
or the governments they represent. 
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Summary 
 
1. This paper assesses labor market trends and outcomes in Pakistan over the past 
decade. It shows that despite a high rate of employment growth, labor market outcomes have 
been disappointing: most jobs have been created in low productivity sectors/activities, and 
even if they provide a minimum level of income to often avoid poverty, they remain low 
quality jobs providing little or no protection to workers against shocks. In addition, female 
participation rates for women are very low and there are large income disparities between 
rural and urban areas, and across sectors. A fundamental part of the problem is the low level 
of education of the labor force. 
 
2. Going forward, young demographics present challenges and opportunities. The 
economy has slowed down and if current trends are not reversed labor markets will not be 
able to absorb the large number of young workers entering the labor market. Around 1.5 
million new jobs will be needed every year to keep unemployment rate at current levels. If 
the real GDP growth rate remains at the post-crisis level (around 3 percent), all things being 
equal, the unemployment rate by year of 2020 could be as high as 14 percent. Increasing 
female participation rates bring additional challenges. If the participation rates of women 
with primary/secondary education catches up with that of their less educated counterpart 
and the overall participation rate reaches 27 percent by 2020, additional 2.6 million jobs will 
be needed. In such case, with current employment-growth elasticity of 0.528, almost an extra 
one percentage point in economic growth will be needed to avoid an increase in 
unemployment. At the same time, if the economy is able to maintain high growth to absorb 
the new entrants it can realize a demographic dividend, benefiting from the high share of 
those working relative to the share of dependents and thus high income per capita and 
standards of living. To this end the economy would need to grow by 6 percent per year or 
more. 
 
3. There are several types of interventions that the Government needs to consider to 
improve labor market outcomes. Much attention needs to be paid to the role of 
macroeconomic and regulatory policies, and the education system. Macroeconomic policies 
that promote stability, reduce the costs of doing business, and improve investment 
prospects—by facilitating the entry and exit of firms—are crucial to increase labor demand. 
Improving the level of education of the labor force through better primary, secondary and 
higher education is also a pre-condition to improve labor market outcomes.  
 
4. Issues related to education policies include: expanding learning opportunities for the 
population especially those in rural areas; improving the quality of education at all levels by 
enhancing teachers’ competences and incentives, upgrading curriculum, and increasing the 
use of textbooks and learning materials; and improving the governance of the education 
system at the province level. The main challenge to improve labor market outcomes over the 
long term is expanding primary and secondary schooling particularly among girls ensuring 
they acquire the basic cognitive and non-cognitive skills that are needed to ensure the 
acquisition of technical and job-specific skills later in their lives. The other area concerns 
improving the relevance of tertiary education so that it responds to rapidly changing 
demands for high skills in globalized markets. These policies, however, will have effects on 
labor markets mainly over the medium and long term.  
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5. Over the relatively short term, the focus in Pakistan should be on improving the labor 
market opportunities of those who are already in the labor force, either working in low 
productivity jobs or in transition from school or unemployment to a job—with particular 
attention to youth and women. The areas that require immediate interventions include 
targeted programs to improve skills and employability through active labor market policies 
(ALMPs) and to expand earnings opportunities through entrepreneurial support. In 
addition, a gradual reform is needed to enhance technical and vocational education and 
training system, and to protect workers’ income and guarantee basic standards in terms of 
working conditions. These labor market policies need to be carefully designed according to 
the context and policy environment of each province given the heterogeneity of the labor 
market conditions and recent devolution. 
 
6. Improving the skills and employability of the existing workforce as well as building 
skills for new entrants is a precondition to improving labor market outcomes. On-the-job 
trainings (OJT) and training-related Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs) for targeted 
groups are useful tools for the existing workforce, while Technical and Vocational Education 
and Training (TVET) is relevant for new entrants. The challenge in Pakistan is to improve the 
TVET system and to introduce well designed OJT and ALMPs programs. Pakistan has 
already made considerable progress by having a Technical Education and Vocational 
Training Authority (TEVTA) that coordinates the design and implementation of TVET 
programs toward more private sector involvement and autonomous public training 
institutions. In line with this, introducing performance-based financing (e.g. Nepal’s 
employment fund) or training vouchers (e.g. Kenya’s Technical and Vocational Vouchers 
Program) allocated directly to individuals who can then choose providers will also lead to 
more relevant training. More efforts need to be made to provide opportunities to vulnerable 
youth and women in the informal sector, often school dropouts, not eligible for TVET. For 
them, targeted training programs fostering life and technical skills through private providers 
can be considered in order to facilitate transitions from unemployment to wage- or self- 
employment. Establishing a practice of monitoring and evaluation of these programs is of 
course a necessary condition to improve their performance over time. 
 
7. Supporting self employment and entrepreneurship is critical given that wage 
employment is limited and a large number of jobs are being created from microenterprises. 
International evidence suggests that packages of entrepreneurship programs, such as 
combinations of business skills training, access to finance, advisory services, and 
microfranchising, can be effective in improving labor market outcomes. Such programs can 
be tailored to serve particular target groups including women and youth, and merit more 
support and resource allocation. Targeted interventions and investment that combines skills 
training and social services (e.g. family planning, child care and health services) with 
endeavors to address social norms and cultural factors are promising especially to increase 
female labor force participation. For instance, Pakistan’s own National Rural Support 
Program (NRSP) reaches out to unskilled, uneducated rural youth living in poverty, taking 
advantage of an existing network of community organizers to identify eligible households in 
rural communities, and provides skills training, access to credit and advisory services.  
 
8. In addition, public works and services are potentially effective interventions to 
directly create jobs. In the past, public works have become one of the primary instruments to 
provide transient work opportunities in response to crisis (e.g. Argentina in 2002, Republic 
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of Korea in 1997). However, the agenda is evolving as they increasingly aim to move beyond 
a temporary safety net during a crisis towards a spring-board that improves sustainable 
employment opportunities. More recent programs have incorporated a number of design 
and operational innovations to create a pathway out of poverty, linking beneficiaries to 
employment and community services, helping them increase earnings and build assets. 
Countries that have public works programs with these features include El Salvador (PATI), 
Ethiopia (Productive Safety Net Program) and Argentina (Jefes y Jefas). Programs can also 
target skilled workers and offer temporary job opportunities providing services to the 
community.  
 
9. Finally, Pakistan needs to consider reforms in labor regulation and social insurance 
policies. Reforming labor regulation and social insurance aims not only to better protect 
workers by expanding coverage, but also to remove constraints that might be reducing 
incentives to create formal jobs. The Government needs to simplify the labor regulation and 
focus on core labor standards and working conditions, adopting more flexible regulations in 
hiring and dismissal procedures (including severance pay). Minimum wage policies would 
also need to be reviewed to set transparent adjustment rules reflecting the positions of 
employees, employers and the government and to reduce discretion that can penalize either 
employees or employers. Finally, regarding pensions, the main reform would be to move to a 
system based on defined contributions (that could remain pay-as-you-go), which guarantees 
portability of pension rights across provinces and enables an expansion of coverage to 
informal sector.  
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Introduction 
 
10. Pakistan is currently in the midst of a demographic transition that is bringing a 
growing number of youth into the labor market. This youth bulge that is unwinding opens 
both challenges and opportunities. Challenges because of the need to create enough jobs to 
employ new entrants; Opportunities, because if this is done the country will enjoy a 
‘demographic dividend’, as the share of those employed relative to the dependent increases, 
driving up income per capita and standards of living.1  
 
11. To date, although the number of jobs has increased rapidly, labor market outcomes 
have been disappointing. Over the past decade, employment in Pakistan has been growing at 
a rate faster than the average of other South Asian countries,2 and at par with the growth in 
the labor force. However, many of the jobs created have been in low productivity agriculture 
and/or low productivity household enterprises that generate low earnings (even if not below 
the poverty line). Most jobs created also are unable to provide access to social insurance and 
appropriate worker protection.3 The movement of jobs from agriculture into industry and 
services has been very slow, and the share of wage employment has been declining. So, 
although the quantity of jobs so far does not seem to have been an issue and has increased as 
rapidly as labor force increase there are concerns about the quality of the jobs created and 
the perspectives for the future. Earnings vary significantly by education level and the type of 
employment, with large gaps between urban and rural areas, and across provinces. 
Moreover, women’s participation in the labor market is still very low (23.5 percent among 
women vs. 84.3 percent among men).  
 
12. Labor market outcomes reflect in part the very low level of education of the work 
force and are particularly worrisome for youth and women. Despite major progress in the 
context of the Millennium Development Goals, still a third of youth has no schooling. On 
average, those in the labor force have only studied for 5.1 years and 43 percent have no 
education. Even those who received education may not have the skills necessary to succeed 
in the labor market, while opportunities for skills upgrading and development are limited.  
 
13. There are several types of interventions that the Government needs to consider to 
improve labor market outcomes. A pre-condition is to have business environment conducive 
to the creation of new firms. Indeed, in low and middle income countries the creation of new 
jobs is driven in large part by the creation of new firms.4 Macroeconomic and regulatory 
policies that promote stability, reduce the costs of doing business and improve investment 
prospects—by facilitating the entry and exit of firms—and are thus critical to the creation of 
quality jobs. Improving the level of education of the labor force through better primary, 
secondary and higher education is also a pre-condition to improve labor market outcomes. 
In particular, more targeted and focused interventions are needed at both ends of the 
education system. On one hand, expanding opportunities for universal primary schooling 
with improved quality, especially among the disadvantaged girls in rural areas merits 
continued emphasis. On the other hand, improving the quality of tertiary education is crucial 
so that it is able to respond to rapidly changing demand for skills in globalized markets.  
                                                          
1 For a discussion about the causes and economic impacts of demographic transitions, see Bloom et al. (2011).  
2 Average employment growth rates were 3.6% per year in Pakistan vs. regional average of 3.1% per year 
3 Note that throughout the paper, ‘(unpaid) family workers’ and ‘household enterprises’ are interchangeably used. 
4 Ayyagari et al. (2011)  
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14. Over the short-term, the focus in Pakistan should be on improving the labor market 
opportunities of those who are already in the labor force, either working in low productivity 
jobs or in transition to a job. Particular attention should be paid to youth and women who 
face special constraints to access good jobs. Overall, targeted interventions are needed to 
improve skills and employability; address constraints that affect the capacity of the self-
employed or small entrepreneurs to increase their earnings; and expand access to systems 
that protect workers’ income and guarantee basic standards in terms of working conditions.  
 
15. This paper provides an in-depth assessment of labor markets in Pakistan and outlines 
policy recommendations in the areas of skills development, support to entrepreneurship and 
workers protection. The paper is based on a review of previous studies of the labor market 
(see Box 1) and new analysis of survey and administrative data, as well as discussions with 
policymakers and stakeholders. The policy recommendations take into account the ongoing 
devolution process, which transferred labor policy instruments from federal to provincial 
governments in July 2011.  
 
16. The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections look at the supply and 
demand side of the labor market respectively. The paper starts by analyzing the evolution of 
labor force, the distribution of skills, where jobs have been created, and the implications for 
labor productivity growth. It then moves on to focus on the analysis of labor market 
outcomes at the individual level. It discusses the determinants of participation rates, 
unemployment, type of work, and earnings. Based on this analysis of trends and labor 
market outcomes the paper concludes by identifying key areas for policy interventions.  
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A large number of studies have examined various factors that could potentially affect labor market trends 
and outcomes in Pakistan. Many of them noted demographic changes as a main pressure of the supply 
side of labor which will eventually be a determinant of growth potential (World Bank 2011; Hussain et al. 
2009; Nayab 2006). Increases in working age population and decreases in dependency ratio, due to 
declines in fertility rate and population growth, can provide a unique opportunity of development to reap 
‘demographic dividend’ as evidence from East Asian countries suggests (Bloom et al. 1998; Bloom and 
Williamson 2000). However, abundant young workers without productive activities may be a source of 
social unrest by engaging in socially undesirable activities (World Bank 2011b). Pakistan is at this crossroad 
in managing the youth bulge. 
 
Recent studies examined how the demographic factor manifested in the labor market in Pakistan taking 
advantage of micro data sets such as a series of regular Labor Force Surveys (LFS). They conducted 
descriptive analysis on the main labor market indicators including labor force participation, employment, 
and earnings, disaggregating them by gender, education and region (Nikitin 2011; World Bank 2011a; ADB 
2008; ILO 2008). They pointed to the prevalent and persistent issue of labor market segregation, 
emphasizing the dire situation of youth as well as women and rural workers. The opportunities of 
employment for the disadvantaged workers are very limited (ILO 2008; Hou 2011; Naqvi and Shanaz 2002; 
Aslam 2009). Moreover, the overall job quality is low that informality prevails and labor earnings are 
hardly enough to move households out of poverty (Cnobloch and Salam 2011; Lloyod et al. 2010). 
 
A few main constraints to creating more and better jobs that require long-term policy reforms include: 
low investment in human capital and skills development (World Bank 2007; Bloom et al. 2009; NAVTEC 
2009; Jacoby and Mansuri 2011); poor business environment (Doing Business 2011); rigid labor market 
regulations (World Bank 2006; Pierre and Scarpetta 2007); and macroeconomic instability due to conflicts 
and natural disasters (World Bank 2010c). While all of these areas are relevant and should improve over 
time, more strategic action plans and options for policy interventions need to be delved in order to 
address the rapidly emerging youth issues in the labor market. 
Previous Studies on Youth in Labor Market of Pakistan Box 1 
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Dynamics of Labor Supply  
 
17. This section first looks at the determinants of labor force growth: the size of the 
working age population5 and participation rates. It then looks at the distribution of skills and 
future prospects.  
 
Demographics and Labor Force Participation 
 
18. Over the past ten years, the labor force especially among youth has increased at a 
faster rate than the regional average (Table 1).6 Between 2000 to 2009, the labor force grew 
at 3.5 percent per year as a result of both an increase in working age population and 
participation rates. The youth workforce grew even faster at 3.9 percent per year, compared 
to a regional average of 2.7 percent.7  
 
19. Pakistan is now in the midst of a ‘demographic bulge’, with the number of people 
entering working age expanding at a faster rate than the total population. This phenomenon 
will likely last at least for another ten years (See Figure 1). As fertility and mortality rates 
decline, the share of children is contracting while the share of working age population 
expands.8 The youth population (ages between 15 and 24) today is about 18 million, 
representing 36 percent of the working age population. Without changes in participation 
rates, the labor force is expected to grow by 2.7 percent per year, with around 1.7 million 
young workers entering the labor market each year. And if female labor force participation 
increases, the pressure for new jobs on the labor market would be larger.  
 
20. The outcome of this demographic transition will depend on the capacity of the 
economy to absorb new entrants to labor market. In principle, a higher share of working age 
population relative to the population of dependents leads to an increase in income per capita. 
And in case of Pakistan, to date, employment has been growing as fast as the labor force, 
even in the case of youth. Hence, the country has not experienced an increase in 
unemployment, and international migration does not seem to be an important factor in 
keeping the unemployment rate low given the size of net emigration (0.8 percent of labor 
force as of 2009).9 Looking forward, however, a large influx of workers can become a 
challenge. An increase in female labor force participation (from 16.7 percent in 2000 to 23.5 
percent in 2009) will also add pressure to the quantity of jobs needed. In addition, as 
discussed above, there is a concern with the quality of jobs created. The abundant labor 
supply can also likely lower the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis employers, leading to 
lower wage rates and investments in skills, and to limited worker protection.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Working age population in this article is defined as ages of 15 or above, and youth are those between 15 and 24.  
6 Note that we only specify the most recent year for simplicity when presenting data constructed over two years. 
For instance, we specify ‘2009’ when using the LFS 2008-09 data. 
7 Note that Pakistan figures compare year 2000 and 2009, while regional average compares the period of 1995-99 
to 2005-08 due to limited data availability. 
8 Total number of births per woman steadily decreased since mid 1980’s from 6.5 to 3.9 in 2009 according to 
World Development Indicators. 
9 According to Migration Factbook published from the World Bank, net emigration as of 2010 is 443 thousands, 
which is merely 0.8 percent of labor force. A high proportion (about 12 percent) of tertiary educated skilled 
workers are among those emigrated and about 6 percent of GDP came from remittances as of 2009.  
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Source: International Data Base by US census bureau (http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php) 
 
 
 
 
 
      Source: WDI, ILO-KILM, US Census Bureau. 
Notes: Data for Pakistan comes from WDI and labor force surveys for 2000 and 2009. The regional average comes 
from a four-year average value of the period 2005-08 relative to the five-year average of values for the baseline 
period 1995-99 from WDI and ILO-KILM due to missing data 
 
 
Skills 
 
21. A major challenge facing Pakistan is the large stock of unskilled workers already in 
labor force and a flow of unskilled youth entering labor market. The general education level 
among employed workers in Pakistan has barely improved and about 40 percent have no 
education regardless of their geographic location (Figure 2).10 The average educational 
attainment of the working age population is quite low and there are wide gaps between 
                                                          
10 Figures related to education and labor market outcomes hereafter are calculated from the Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) unless mentioned. 
Other SA countries 
2000 2009 Percentage change (%) Percentage change (%)
Labor Force
Population (million) 144.5 170.5 18.0% 17.6%
Labor Force  (mill ion) 43.0 57.9 34.7% 30.9%
Youth labor force  (mill ion) 12.7 17.7 38.7% 26.8%
Employment
Employed (million) 40.0 55.0 37.6% 30.5%
Employed Youth (million) 11.2 16.2 44.0% 27.7%
Pakistan
Change of Demographic Structure: 1990-2020 Figure 1 
Labor Market Indicators of Pakistan Compared to Region Average Table 1 
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genders (the average years of schooling are 6.5 for men and 3.5 for women in 2009). In this 
regard, there are large variations across urban/rural, provinces and income groups. Thus, 
the average years of schooling among the employed range from 4.7 in Balochistan to 5.4 in 
NWFP, and the education level in rural areas falls behind that of urban areas (the proportion 
of workers with primary and above education is about 71 percent in urban areas vs. 43 
percent in rural areas).  
 
22. Youth’s education attainment is higher than the average of the working age 
population, reflecting improvements in education, but still about a third of youth have no 
education at all. The average years of schooling is 6.5 and 3.5 among male and female 
working age population respectively, while the figures for youth are almost 7.0 years for male 
and 5.3 years for female (Figure 3). This indicates a significant progress in education 
especially among women. Despite the progress, however, it is unlikely that Pakistan will 
meet UN’s Millennium Development Goals in primary education.11 As of 2009, the 
proportion of youth without any education is 20 percent among male and 41 percent among 
female, which is the lowest level among South Asian countries. Even among those who 
attend primary education, the completion rate is only 35 percent.12 Gaps across provinces 
and between social groups (including Castes) are likely to persist.13 
 
23. Literacy rates among the workforce again underscore the bleak situation. As of 2009, 
the literacy rates among female and male youth were only 61 and 79 percent respectively—
again the lowest levels among South Asian countries. A little over a half of employed workers 
(58%) are literate—and only 48 percent in rural areas. This high level of illiteracy drastically 
limits workers ability to develop new skills and therefore their labor market opportunities. 
 
24. Even among those who attended school there are concerns about the skills effectively 
acquired. Indeed, despite quantitative progress in school attainment, qualitative evaluations 
of students’ learning are often negative. For example, a recent study looking at the quality of 
schooling in Punjab region, found that almost 80 percent of third graders cannot read first 
grade texts.14 The curriculums and textbooks are criticized to be unrealistic compared to 
students’ cognitive abilities.15 The relevance of the skills acquired is also an issue. Thus, one 
third of graduates from tertiary education are in jobs that do not use the skills they 
acquired.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDG) aims to ensure by 2015 that all children, boys and 
girls alike, should be able to complete primary schooling, and there have been worldwide efforts to achieve this 
goal 
12 See Robalino et al. (2011a). 
13 See Jacoby and Mansuri (2011). 
14 See Andrabi et al. (2009). 
15 Warwick and Reimers (1995).  
16 Farooq (2011). 
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    Source: Authors’ calculation from the Labor Force Survey: various years. 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Authors’ calculation from the Labor Force Survey: various years. 
 
 
 
 
Education Distribution among Workers Aged 15 to 64 by Province Figure 2 
Educational Distribution of Youth Aged 15 to 24 Years by Province Figure 3 
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25. Projections show that, even under optimistic scenarios, there will only be limited 
improvements in the distribution of skills in the labor force. Under a Constant Enrollment 
Number (CEN) scenario, the share of unskilled workers would remain virtually unchanged 
by year 2030 (see Figure 4). A more positive scenario, Global Education Trend (GET), which 
assumes sufficient investments to allow enrollment in education to expand according to 
historical trends, shows a substantial increase in secondary education.17 But the share of 
workers with tertiary education would remain small. These results show the importance of 
policy interventions to improve the skills of workers who are out of formal education system. 
 
 
 
Pakistan 2030 – CEN Pakistan 2030 – GET 
  
Source: Robalino et al. (2011b) Annexure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The projections presented here are from Robalino et al. (2011b). Their model, based on Samir et al. (2010), 
includes differential fertility based on education. Constant Enrollment Number (CEN) scenario assumes that 
school enrollment of a new cohort of population remains constant without expansion, imposing most 
conservative scenario of population’s education. On the contrary, Global Education Trend (GET) scenario 
assumes that how rapidly school enrollment expands for each cohort is determined by a common global 
relationship between the overall enrollment rate and expansion. Using the global trend and country specific 
figures including initial education, population and fertility rate, GET model provides a plausible scenario of 
workforce growth and their educational attainment. For more detailed discussion see Samir et al. (2010). 
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Dynamics of Labor Demand  
 
26. This section looks at the ‘demand side’ of the labor market, focusing on the quantity 
and types of jobs that have been created and in which sectors. It compares trends in job 
creation with trends in labor supply and discusses the challenges going forward in terms of 
GDP growth. It also analyzes the effects of employment creation patterns on labor 
productivity growth and its contribution to GDP per capita growth.  
 
Employment Creation 
 
27. Employment in Pakistan has grown as rapidly as the labor force due, in part, to 
strong economic growth which has averaged 5.2 percent annually over the past decade 
except for economic downturns in 2001 and 2009. However, due to recent global recession, 
Pakistan’s growth rate has declined to around 3 percent,18 which could have cost the country 
around 0.64 million jobs annually (See Box 2). If the real GDP growth rate remains at 3 
percent, all things being equal, the unemployment rate by the year of 2020 could be as high 
as 14 percent.19 To absorb all the new entrants to the labor market without increases in 
participation rate and keeping the unemployment rate at the level of 2009 (5.1%), GDP 
would need to grow at least at 5 percent per year.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 An average of the real GDP growth rates among 3.68% (2008), 1.72% (2009) and 3.76% (2010) is 3.05%. 
19 With constant employment-output elasticity, a 3 percent real GDP growth rate translates to 1.58 percent 
employment growth. This yields that employment to population ratio is 0.46, given the current number of 
employed and predicted population by 2020. Under current labor force participation at 53.1 percent, 
unemployment is calculated to be about 14 percent (unemployment rate=1-emp2pop/lfp, where emp2pop 
presents employment-to-population ratio and lfp denotes labor force participation).  
20 To be consistent with National Statistics, we used the definition of unemployment as in the labor force survey: 
those who are available and seeking jobs but currently without work, or who are not currently available due to 
illness, temporary lay-off or apprenticeship. 
Based on the size of population by each gender and age projected by UN and making the following 
assumptions: 
 The elasticity of employment with respect to output is from the regression coefficient (  ) using data 
between 1999 and 2009 of the equation:    (        )         (        )          , 
estimated at 0.528, and assumed to remain constant; 
 The gender ratio among the unemployed remains the same as 2009 where about 60 percent are 
male and 40 percent female; 
 Labor force participation rate of men in 2020 will be at the same level as 2009 at 81.7percent;  
 Labor force participation rate of women in 2020 can be either at (i) the level of 2009—23.5% or (ii) a 
more optimistic level—27.4% that can be reached if the participation rate of those with primary and 
secondary education catches up with that of  their less educated peers; 
The size of male labor force by 2020 will be 59 million. Depending on female labor force participation rate, 
the size of female labor force will range from 15.9 to 18.5 million.  
 If the unemployment was to remain around at 5.1% as in 2009, the number of jobs needed is 71.2 
million to 73.8 million which requires annual GDP growth rate to be 5% to 6%.  
 If the annual GDP growth rate were at 3% (actual level during the global crisis), the number of jobs 
created would be 64.6 million and overall unemployment rates would be 14% to 17% with 10.5-13.1 
million unemployed workers. 
Required Number of Jobs by Different Scenario Box 2 
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28. When increases in women’s labor force participation are considered, the pressure to 
job creation becomes even greater. The UN projection of population shows that working age 
population in Pakistan by 2020 will be about 140 million. When the current labor force 
participation for each gender is applied, the projected size of labor force in 2020 would be 
about 75.1 million (59.1 million male and 16.0 million female). If female participation rates 
reach 27.4 percent by 2020, additional 2.6 million female workers would enter the labor 
force increasing the projected size of the labor force to 77.7 million.21 Assuming constant 
output-employment elasticity, almost an extra one percent of real GDP growth would be 
needed to keep unemployment rates as it is while absorbing increased female workers.  
 
29. Not only the quantity of jobs, but also their quality poses a significant challenge to 
Pakistan. Between 2000 and 2009, 15 million ‘new jobs’ were created in Pakistan, but most 
were in low quality activities. First, still more than a third of jobs were created in the 
agriculture sector and 45 percent of workers engaged in agriculture (see Figure 5) even 
though its share of GDP decreased from 26 to 21 percent over the same period.22 The 
industrial sector provided 20 percent of the jobs and services—the remaining 44 percent. 
Overall, the share of employment in agriculture decreased due to an increase in service share 
only between 2000 and 2002, yet since 2002 the share of employment in the agriculture 
sector has been on an increase with that of industry being stagnant (see Figure 6).  
 
30. Secondly, about sixty percent of the jobs created were in household enterprises and 
self employment which is usually considered to be low productivity (Figure 5). Over the last 
decade, the share of workers in family businesses increased by about 8 percentage points 
(from 21.4 to 29.6 percent). Wage and salary jobs created during the period constituted 
about 36 percent of the total. In fact, over time, the shares of wage employment and even 
self-employment have been on a downward trend.23  
 
 
 
 
    Source: Authors’ calculation from the Labor Force Survey 2000 and 2009 
                                                          
21 As of 2009, female labor force participation is lowest among those with primary and secondary education at 
around 14%. If the participation rate of these education group increases up to an average rate (23.5%) by 2020, 
the overall female labor force participation rate would be around 27%. 
22 World Development Indicators. 
23 Employers and self employed are combined in this graph. 
Jobs Created Between 2000 and 2009 Figure 5 
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    Source: Authors’ calculation from the Labor Force Survey: various years. 
 
31. Finally, even when it comes to wage employment many of the jobs created were in the 
informal sector.24 Among the 5.4 million wage jobs created over the past ten years about 76 
percent were in informal sector, leaving the share of informal employment among wage 
employment slightly increased from 58.9 to 63.6 percent. Indeed, the share of individuals 
working in firms with any written contracts is barely 13 percent of the total employed.25  
This, to some extent, is not surprising given that the majority of individuals work in firms 
(95.9 percent) that are with less than 10 employees. The fact is, however, that the large 
majority of Pakistani wage earners is in lower productivity jobs and lacks an access to income 
protection systems.  
 
Employment and Labor Productivity 
 
32. Where jobs are created ultimately determines the dynamics of aggregate labor 
productivity and economic growth. As employment moves from low to high productivity 
firms within sectors, and from low to high productivity sectors/activities, overall labor 
productivity increases and so does income per capita. Here we look at the decomposition of 
GDP per-capita growth in terms of labor productivity growth, employment growth and the 
increase in share of working age population.26 In addition, we examine how job creation 
within and across sectors affected employment and productivity growths.27 
 
33. In Pakistan the increase in GDP per capita between 2000 and 2009 was in large part 
due to an increase in the quantity of labor rather than labor productivity. Per capita GDP 
adjusted by PPP increased from 1,845 to 2,357 dollars over the period at an average of 3.1 
percent per year. About 37 percent of this increase, however, was explained by an increase in 
labor productivity approximated by output per worker (see Table 2). Increases in 
                                                          
24 Informal workers are broadly defined as those who work as a family worker, casual wage workers paid by 
piecemeal, worker at firms without contracts, workers at small firms (below 10) and agricultural workers.  
25 When asked about written contracts, in LFS, they answer “yes”, “no”, and “don’t know.” These figures are 
calculated based on the proportion of “yes” and should be interpreted with caution. For example, the share of 
firms with written contracts increase over time, which may reflect improved knowledge not so much as an 
increase in written contracts.  
26 There are a few caveats in this approach worth mentioning: this is descriptive and accounting based, and does 
not draw causal inference between the productivity and growth per capita; the measure of productivity here (GDP 
per worker), being roughly calculated, may not fully capture the actual hourly productivity of a worker; and 
depending on the GDP measures (Purchase Power Parity terms or CPI adjusted real terms) the results can differ. 
27 See Annexure 1 for a technical detail. 
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employment and the share of working age population contributed 27 and 36 percent 
respectively to GDP per capita growth. Thus, much of the improvements in income per capita 
are explained by demographic factors rather than increased output per capita.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34. The slow growth in labor productivity is explained by the little enhancement in sector 
productivity and slow structural transformation (see Tables 3 and 4). Among the increase in 
the overall employment ratio between 2000 and 2009, about 81 percent is explained by the 
increase in employment in service which experienced merely 2.59 percentage points increase 
in employment ratio over this period. Transition from agriculture to higher productivity 
industry and service is very slow, and still about 45% of the employed are in agriculture. 
 
35. There exists a large gap across sectors in the level of output per worker. The 
productivity of agriculture in 2000 was about a third of that in services and the gap has been 
widening. Indeed, labor productivity in agriculture decreased by 2.3 percent between 2000 
and 2009, whereas it increased in the industry and services by 12.8 and 6.7 percent, 
respectively (see Table 4). Overall, Pakistan’s worker productivity improved by a meager 9.5 
percent—this is the lowest level of labor productivity even for the developing world.28 As an 
illustration, if intersectoral shifts from the agriculture to industry sector take place so that 
the employment share of agriculture and industry becomes 30% and 35% respectively, 
output per worker (productivity) would be around 1,565 instead of 636 dollars (See the 7th 
column in Table 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 See Cho et al. (forthcoming) for the summary of labor productivity trends by the type of countries defined in 
the paper. Even the group of countries that made slow progress in labor productivity increased GDP per worker 
by 15 percent over 10 years from 1995-99 to 2005-09. 
Outcomes 2000 2009 Contribution Change ($)
GDP per capita (PPP) 1,845 2,357 100.0% 512
Output per worker 6,671 7,307 37.3% 191
Employment ratio 47.2% 50.4% 26.6% 136
Working age population
share
58.6% 64.0% 36.1% 185
Source: Size of population, labor force, and workers , and GDP (PPP) from WDI
Of working age population 2000 2009 Difference Contribution Change ($)
Agriculture workers ratio 22.8% 22.7% -0.11pp -3.6% -5
Industry workers ratio 9.2% 9.9% 0.72pp 22.6% 31
Service workers ratio 15.2% 17.8% 2.59pp 81.0% 110
Total (Employment ratio) 47.2% 50.4% 3.20pp 100.0% 136
Source: Sector share of contribution to GDP from WDI
Decomposition of GDP per capita Growth between 2000 and 2009 Table 2 
Decomposition of Growth in Employment Ratio by Sector between 2000 and 2009 
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Source: Employment share of each sector from LFS; GDP (PPP) and the number of workers from WDI 
 
36. In summary, the demographic changes that are reducing the number of dependents 
per working age individuals generate a window of opportunity to increase income per capita. 
To make this happen, the growing workforce needs to be involved in productive activities. 
Unfortunately, over the past decade the share of workers in each sector leveled and sector 
productivity improved little, leading to a meager change in income per capita. Today 
government efforts should focus on two fronts: (i) increasing productivity within each sector 
especially in agriculture; and (ii) expanding non-agricultural job opportunities and 
facilitating transitions into these jobs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Share Output/ Share Output/worker di fference[%]
(1) worker (3) (4) (5)
(2)
Agriculture 48.4% 3,574 45.1% 3,492 -82.3 [-2.3] -38.8 [-6.10] -24.7 [-1.60]
Industry 19.4% 8,021 19.6% 9,046 1024.5 [12.8] 199.6 [31.4] 358.6 [22.9]
Service 32.2% 10,514 35.3% 11,216 702.7 [6.7] 237.1 [37.3] 245.9 [15.7]
Intersectoral shift 237.8 [37.3] 985.4 [63.0]
Average (total) 100.0% 6,671 100.0% 7,307 635.7 [9.5] 636 [100] 1,565 [100]
Hypothetical 
scenario
Agriculture: 30%
Industry: 35%
service: 35%
Contribution2000 2009
Actual 
Productivity 
change
Dol lars  [%]
(6)
Changes in Labor Productivity (Output per Worker) by Sector 
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Youth and Labor Market Outcomes 
 
37. This section analyzes how labor market outcomes in Pakistan vary as a function of 
individual characteristics. The focus is on labor force participation and unemployment rates, 
type of job and sector, and earnings. The results show that there are important variations 
across regions and that unskilled workers, women and youth tend to be more vulnerable and 
display worse labor market outcomes.29 
 
Youth in Labor Force Participation and Unemployment Rates 
 
38. Among men, education is the most important predictor of labor force participation 
both in urban and rural areas.30 Except for the group with less than primary education, 
higher education is associated with higher participation rates relative to lower secondary and 
pre-university education (see Figure 7A).31 Overall, labor force participation for men is quite 
high and stable over time across all education levels. Adult workers and those who are 
married are more likely to participate in the labor market than young or single men.  
 
39. Women show different and more complicated patterns of labor force participation. 
They are much less likely to participate than men. Indeed, despite some progress observed 
over time, overall women’s labor force participation is still the lowest level in the region.32 
Education is an important predictor of labor force participation; women with higher 
education are less likely to enter the labor force than women with no education except for the 
group with pre-university and above education in urban areas. While being married is 
positively associated with labor force participation for men, the opposite is true for women. 
The number of children, however, does not seem to have an effect on labor force 
participation. Like in the case of men, other things being equal, younger women are less 
likely to participate.  
 
40. In terms of unemployment, similar factors affect both men and women although the 
extent of correlation varies (see Figure 7B).33 Higher education is associated with higher 
unemployment rates particularly in rural areas where the demand for highly educated 
workers may be low. Being married is significantly correlated with lower unemployment, 
especially for men, suggesting that the responsibility to support their families upon marriage 
may reduce the reservation wage to reduce unemployment. Youth unemployment rate is 
higher than that of adults for both men and women, even controlling for the fact that 
younger workers have higher education. In year 2009, youth unemployment experienced a 
particularly high increase as the economic downturn affected them more than adults.34 
 
                                                          
29 For summary statistics for the analysis, see Annexure 2A and 2B. 
30 See Annexure 3A and 3B for labor force participation rate, employment ratio and unemployment rate by 
gender and education. 
31 See Annexure 4A for regression results of the determinants of labor force participation by gender and region. 
32 The region’s average female labor force participation during 2005-08 was 46.3% while that of Pakistan was 
20.7%. Only the MENA region has a lower level female labor force participation (26.9%) than that of South Asia 
region, and all the others show significantly higher rates (EAP: 58.4%, ECA: 52.0%, LAC: 48.9%, and AFR: 
63.8%, see World Development Indicators). 
33 See Annexure 4B for regression results of the determinants of unemployment by gender and region. 
34 When regressed with the interaction of indicators of youth and year 2009, the coefficient of unemployment 
showed significantly negative values suggesting a large hit from the economic downturn. This is consistent with 
the finding that the recent great recession has disproportionately affected youth across developing countries. See 
Cho and Newhouse (2011). 
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Male Female 
  
Source: Author’s regression based on LFS various years. See Annexure 3A for the regression results. 
Note: Each bar represents relative (to omitted category) contribution to the labor force participation rate (in 
percentage points).  
 
 
 
Male Female 
  
Source: Author’s regression based on LFS various years. See Annexure 3B for the regression results. 
Note: Each bar represents relative (to omitted category) contribution to the unemployment rate (in percentage 
points).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contribution of Major Variables to LFP by Gender Figure 7A 
Contribution of Major Variables to Unemployment by Gender Figure 7B 
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Types of Jobs 
 
41. Education is a significant factor determining what type of jobs—regular wage 
employment, casual wage employment, self employment and family workers—people get.35 
Workers with higher education (secondary and tertiary education) are generally 
concentrated in regular wage employment and then self employment, while less educated 
workers tend to work more frequently as casual or family workers. Casual wage employment 
provides work opportunities particularly for less educated men and youth, while family work 
mostly absorbs low educated women as well as youth. The effect of education in determining 
access to wage employment is stronger for women. Not surprisingly, the regression results 
indicate that women are more likely to be working on household enterprises if they are 
married and/or have children.  
 
42. It is important to observe that the overall economic slowdown in 2008-09 had an 
effect on the types of jobs that people get. The analysis suggests that while labor force 
participation changed little—except for rural female workers—there were shifts across 
different employment status: regular wage employment and self employment significantly 
declined relative to family workers. Men tended to work more as casual employees, and 
family work increased for females.  
 
43. Individual characteristics including education and age are also significantly 
correlated with the sector where individuals work.36 Not surprisingly, workers with high 
levels of education generally work less in agriculture, construction and manufacturing and 
more in public sector or in services. Men and adult workers are more likely to be in higher 
productivity and higher paying jobs than women and youth. In general, workers’ distribution 
across sectors varies widely across regions. The likelihood of being in a ‘good’ job is higher in 
urban areas and high income provinces.  
 
44. Finally, formal sector employment is highly correlated with individual 
characteristics.37 Although the definition of formality varies—it can be working on a 
registered firm, having a labor contract, or contributing to social security), it usually has 
implications on job quality. Workers in informal sector, in most cases, earn less, are exposed 
to abrupt job loss without security, and have limited access to social insurance and worker 
protection. In Pakistan, like in other developing countries, men are much more likely to have 
a formal sector job than women. Youth, regardless of gender, on the contrary, are more likely 
to work in the informal sector. And, consistent with the previous results, education is a key 
predictor of the quality of the job. Skilled workers are more likely to land jobs protected by 
labor regulations and that offer access to social security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 See Annexure 5 and Annexure 6. 
36 See Annexure 7 and Annexure 8. 
37 See Annexure 8. 
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Earnings and Returns to Education 
 
45. Individual earnings vary considerably by sector and there are important gaps (see 
Table 5). Monthly earnings are highest for the service sector and lowest for agricultural 
workers. Workers in service sector jobs earn almost twice the amount than those in 
agriculture. The gap between public and private sector is also high and persistent. This is 
consistent with the finding in Section 4.2 that workers with high levels of education generally 
work less in the agriculture, construction and manufacturing and more in public sector or in 
services. 
 
 
 
 
Source: LFS of various years 
Notes:  Earnings are in real terms—2005 Pakistan Rupees deflated using the CPI. Earnings information is limited to 
paid workers. 
 
46. Individual characteristics, in particular gender, age and education affect the types of 
jobs that people get and therefore their earnings. In Pakistan, like in other countries, more 
educated workers earn more, so do men relative to women and adult workers relative to 
young workers. The average difference in wages between those with primary education and 
no education is around 14 percent for men and 44 percent for female. Men earn, on average, 
36 percent more than women. And, other things being equal, earnings increase by around 4 
percent with an additional year of schooling.38 
 
47. But investing in education is not always a good idea.39 Internal rates of return are 
high for primary education (relative to no education) but significantly lower for higher 
education (See Table 6). For example, acquiring some education compared to no education 
at all, on average, yields 23 percent of return, whereas completion of primary education 
(versus some primary), secondary (versus primary) and tertiary (versus secondary) only 
yield 0.6, 3.4, and 8.0 percent respectively. This suggests that having some education may 
help workers learn basic literacy and numeracy skills that make a big difference in the labor 
market, but that the additional education does not yield much, unless it is higher education. 
This is explained, in part, by the traditional structure of the economy where a majority of 
                                                          
38 This is based on a Mincerian regression pooling both urban and rural areas, and men and women without 
addressing selectivity.   
39 This finding is based on individuals’ perspective. While the results on high return of primary schooling 
emphasize the importance of basic education, this does not automatically imply that public resources should be 
moved away from higher education. From the social point of view, of course, there are positive spillover effects 
associated with higher education—i.e. the presence of secondary school can have positive effects on enrollment 
rate of primary school and tertiary education would not be possible without secondary education.  
Year 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009
Average 4,697.4 4,328.3 4,640.9 5,094.4 5,478.5 5,288.5 5,280.6
Agriculture 2,716.3 2,387.6 2,682.1 2,567.2 2,966.8 3,060.8 3,114.9
Industry 4,393.1 3,736.8 3,914.9 4,348.2 4,626.6 4,755.9 4,684.5
Service 5,298.3 5,015.2 5,427.7 6,091.8 6,444.5 6,015.5 6,045.1
Private 3,985.3 3,587.9 3,799.8 4,088.4 4,513.8 4,393.7 4,323.0
Public 6,153.0 6,172.3 6,966.5 7,947.0 8,128.9 7,495.6 7,636.1
Contribution of Major Variables to Unemployment by Gender Table 5 
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workers engage in low-skills/labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture where higher skills 
are not well utilized.  
 
 
 
 Source: Robalino et al. (2011a). Calculations from Household Survey Data of 2007/08. 
 
48. The returns to some primary education relative to no schooling experienced a large 
increase over time (from 2000 to 2008), while those for higher education slightly 
decreased.40 The sustained growth in internal rate of return to some primary education 
versus no education implies that the supply of labor with primary school level has been 
growing at a slower rate than the demand. The contrary is true for tertiary education. Either 
the demand for high skilled workers has been growing at a slower rate than the supply, or 
university graduates are not meeting the demands of employers. The latter would imply that 
among university graduates there are two types: those who graduate from prestigious 
universities for whom employers compete and who have seen their earnings increase, and 
those who end up in jobs that do not use their skills where they compete with lower skilled 
workers and who have seen their earnings stagnate or decline.  
 
49. The relative returns to education vary widely by gender, industry and region. Returns 
are generally higher for women than for men, particularly when it comes to some education 
versus no education. In terms of sector, education of all levels tends to be valued more in 
industry, in the utilities and transportation/finance sectors while it pays little in construction 
and commerce. In terms of regions, some primary education is valued significantly more in 
rural than urban areas, although there exists little difference in the returns to other levels of 
education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 See Robalino et al. (2011a) for detailed discussion on the internal rate of return to various education levels.  
Some primary 
vs. No education
Pimary completion 
vs. Some primary
Secondary 
vs. Primary
Tertiary 
vs. Secondary
Overall 23.2% 0.6% 3.4% 8.0%
Male 9.8% 0.6% 3.1% 7.8%
Female 114.2% 0.5% 6.6% 11.3%
Urban 10.3% 1.0% 4.1% 8.1%
Rural 34.2% 0.4% 3.2% 7.9%
Agriculture -2.6% 3.8% 11.5%
Industry 75.2% 4.5% 4.5% 9.1%
Utilities/Transportation 19.7% 3.4% 3.5% 8.1%
Construction/Commerce 3.0% 1.9% 1.7% 5.3%
Other Services 13.8% 1.1% 4.5% 6.9%
Informal 23.2% 0.5% 3.4% 8.2%
Internal Rate of Return to Education Table 6 
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Policy Agenda 
 
50. As discussed in previous section, Pakistan is facing serious problems in terms of 
employment creation. A large share of working age population, mainly women, is not 
participating in the labor force; those who are in labor force work for the most part on low 
productivity activities or are unemployed—including educated workers. Youth are 
particularly vulnerable and because their number is increasing fast, things can further 
deteriorate. The current situation is explained, at least in part, by very low level of education 
of the labor force. Addressing these problems requires interventions at various levels. First to 
facilitate the creation and expansion of business and establishments that will be their main 
source of jobs. Second, to incentivize and enable individuals to access these jobs.    
 
51. Much attention needs to be given to the role of macroeconomic and regulatory 
policies that promote stability, reduce costs of doing business and improve investment 
prospects. As discussed in other parts of the CEM, these polices include balanced budgets, 
competitive exchange rates, investments in infrastructure and urban and agricultural 
development. These policies will determine the capacity of the economy to create jobs. 
 
52. Another area that merits careful long-term planning is education. Improving the level 
of education of the labor force through better primary, secondary and higher education is a 
pre-condition to improving labor market outcomes. Today, two issues need urgent 
intervention. One is expanding universal primary schooling with improved quality, especially 
to the disadvantaged children in rural areas where returns to primary education are 
particularly high (See section 4). One type of intervention to achieve this is cash transfers 
contingent upon children’s schooling.41 A recent study in Pakistan shows promising mid-
term results (after 4 years) particularly among girls.42  
 
53. The other issue is to improve the relevance of tertiary education so that it is able to 
respond to rapidly changing demands for high skills in globalized markets. As discussed 
previously, the returns to tertiary schooling are relatively low today, suggesting that 
graduates are not acquiring skills that significantly improve their job opportunities. The 
Government of Pakistan established the Higher Education Commission (HEC) in 2002 and 
has been involved in reforms to improve quality, enrollment and coverage, and governance.43 
Continuing with these efforts, the government needs to invest more in improving the quality 
of public research and teaching while allowing a stronger participation from the private 
sector.44  
 
54. The effects of many of these interventions, however, will emerge in decades. In order 
to address the problems identified in the previous sections over relatively short term, the 
Government of Pakistan would need to consider interventions in four areas: (i) skills 
development among unskilled workers; (ii) support to entrepreneurship both for new 
entrants and those who are already working, often in low productivity activities; (iii) public 
works and service that can create a large scale job opportunities, and (iv) workers protection 
                                                          
41 See Fiszbein and Shady (2009). 
42 See IEG (2011). 
43 Tertiary education expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 0.09 percent in 2001/02 to 0.29 percent 
in 2005/06, and the share of tertiary education expenditure among total education expenditure increased from 
5.9 to 15.7 percent over the same period. 
44 This figure comes from 2008/09 Pakistan Education Statistics. 
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systems, aiming to adapt current institutions to labor market realities and expand their 
coverage. This section presents policy recommendations at each of these levels (See 
Annexure 9 for summary of policy recommendations). 
 
Skills Development 
 
55. Skills development beyond formal education system is achieved usually through 
TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training), OJT (On the Job Training) and 
training related ALMPs (Active Labor Market Policies).45 These programs complement one 
another to address key market failures in the skills development: employers might not have 
sufficient incentives to invest in their workers due to poaching externalities; workers 
themselves might not invest in training because they do not have access to finance or 
information; and there can be coordination failures between individuals and employers.46 
However, in practice, the design and implementation of these programs are often limited to 
address these failures.  
 
56. Like in other countries, Pakistan skills development policies face problems in terms 
of design and implementation. Pakistan’s TVET system, where public intervention is 
concentrated, is characterized by a fragmented and supply-driven governance structure 
benefiting only a very small segment of the population and struggling to remain relevant. 
There is little understanding of training needs and investments among employers and thus 
no clear vision regarding policies to promote OJT. Finally, training related ALMPs, albeit 
relatively prevalent, are ad-hoc and rely on NGO’s and international organizations operating 
with little or no coordination (see Annexure 10).  
 
57. Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) system in Pakistan is managed 
by multiple ministries and organizations, yet covers only a small fraction of the labor force.47 
Enrollment has increased from 75,000 in 2001-02 to 238,000 in 2005-0648 and more 
programs (such as BBSYDP, Benazir Butto Shaheed Youth Development Program, See Box 
2) are being introduced. However, given that almost 1.5 million youth join the labor force in 
Pakistan every year, this access is very limited.49 In addition, admission is quite restrictive 
since TEVTA programs require secondary or higher education which less than 11 percent of 
                                                          
45 See Almeida et al. (forthcoming) for more detailed discussion. 
46 Individuals might not invest in training because there are not enough jobs for skilled workers and employers 
might not create these jobs because there are not enough skilled workers. Such case is referred to coordination 
failures. 
47 The Ministries of Labor and Manpower, Education, Social Welfare and Industries as well as the office of the 
Primer Minister administer training centers. At the federal level, two autonomous organizations, the National 
Vocational Training and Education Commission (NAVTEC) and the Skills Development Council (SDC), aim to 
regulate and coordinate activities. At the provincial level, provincial Technical Education and Vocational Training 
Authorities (TEVTA) operate and deliver programs while the provincial branches of federal institutions 
independently implement their own programs. In addition, many other government training institutes and 
NGO’s (e.g. National Rural Support Program, NRSP) partnering with international organizations and donor 
agencies, take part in provision of training. Each institution widely varies with their network of trainers and 
private sector partners, target groups, fee structure, curriculums and pedagogical methods and accreditation 
system. 
48 See Blom et al. (2009). 
49 Recall that the proportion of youth who have ever received any vocational training in year 2007 is less than 1 
percent. 
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youth have.50 Thus, less than 1.4 percent of working age population enrolled in TVET during 
the period of 2000-07. 
 
58.  The performance of TVET programs and their impact on labor market outcomes are 
a cause of concern. Some of the problems include outdated or irrelevant courses, poor 
infrastructure and resources, little exposure to industry and a misalignment between 
demand and supply of skills.51 A tracer study of the BBSYDP program, for example, found 
that only 27 percent of participants were engaged in economic activities and 56 percent of 
them were still unemployed and looking for jobs after training.52 The program requires 
training institutes to achieve only about 30 percent of job placement rates. The study showed 
that 20 percent of participants considered job placement services requiring most 
improvement. Although some institutes (e.g. SDC) argue that job placement is part of the 
service provided to the trainees, there is no tracer study still less a rigorous evaluation on the 
impacts of training on participants’ employment opportunities and earnings.53 
 
59. Looking forward, the government needs to consider reforms to improve governance 
and accountability; expand the role of private sector; and review financing mechanisms and 
payment systems:  
 
 Improving governance and accountability. Regardless of financial dependency and 
supervision from government, it is recommended that the training institution and its 
board retain an autonomy in selecting target groups of trainees and training agencies, 
and types of professions and curriculum. Training agencies should be selected based 
on their competency which manifests through placement results, trainees evaluation, 
and employers’ satisfaction, as well as resources and teachers’ qualification. For a fair 
competition among training agencies, the institution should develop a transparent 
assessment system. Tracer studies that track trainees and their performance and the 
open dissemination of results can help. The training programs from the SDC suggest 
a promising model for good governance although a better evaluation system and 
practice is needed for further improvement (See Box 3): they have autonomous 
governance structure, being independent from government in financing and 
operating.  
 
 Expanding the role of private sector. Private sector involvement in skills 
development is crucial and closely related to the efficiency of an institution. The main 
role of private sector in skills development lie in developing relevant training 
contents, delivering training services and also providing internships. Representatives 
from employers should be on the governing bodies of different training agencies. The 
government needs to give an equal chance to both public and private providers and 
design incentives to increase the number of private sector providers of training.  
 
                                                          
50 While the coverage of TVET programs is limited, few other options exist for skill development of labor force; 
every year, Punjab NSC issues about 75-80 thousand certificates to those who take accreditation test including 
20-25 thousand trainees. Training from NRSP covers only about 5,500 participants at a time. Finally, on the job 
training and apprenticeship is very limited. 
51 See Blom et al. (2009); Janjua et al. (2010). 
52 See ILO (2010). 
53 See Janjua (2008). 
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 Reviewing financing mechanisms and payment systems. The government has an 
important role in financing TVET to address some of the market failures including 
liquidity problems facing low income individuals. To the extent possible, limited 
public resource would need to be targeted to the most vulnerable population groups. 
And in order to improve the performance of public and private providers it is 
necessary to review payment systems, moving away from fixed budget allocations. 
One alternative is to use performance-based payment systems, which should be 
particularly relevant for public sector providers. Another alternative is to gradually 
move towards a system of vouchers that individuals use to purchase training from 
public or private providers.54 Recent evaluations show that vouchers improve choice 
and the quality of training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 See Almeida and Cho (2011) and Johanson (2009) for the practice of voucher programs and training fund for 
the selected developing countries. For example, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and Singapore collect payroll 
levies and use the funds to encourage firms to invest in on the job training.  
The BBSYDP is a youth TVET program that the Government of Sindh initiated in 2008 to address youth 
unemployment and skills shortage issues, in collaboration with international organizations including the 
Bank and the ILO. This program targets youth ages between 18 and 35 giving particular attention to female 
and unemployed youth. The majority of participants have secondary and above education (97%). The 
training is provided for almost 90 professions based on the preference of participants for 2-3 months, with 
monthly stipend (PKR 2,500 or USD 29) as well as mobility allowance (PKR 4,000 or USD 470) for long 
commuters. The training is provided from private and public institutes that participated through open 
competition and were selected based on inputs such as adequacy of faculty, facilities, financial situation, 
and so on. See ILO 2010. 
 
The job placement of participants is not satisfactory: more than half of the graduates (56%) were still 
unemployed and looking for jobs and 14% of graduates pursued further education, while only about a 
quarter of them engaged in economic activities. Even among those who work, only 26 percent were full 
time workers while the remaining graduates were part time, seasonal or on call basis workers. Also 
employment was heavily concentrated in education sector. The self reported reasons why the graduates 
remained unemployed were because they were unable to find a job and found needs to further develop 
skills before getting a job. This suggests that the BBSYDP should focus on improving their placement results. 
BBSYDP (Benazir Bhutto Shaheed Youth Development Program) Box 3 
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60. Integrated ALMPs targeted to youth and women. Given the limited coverage of TVET 
programs and multiple constraints facing youth and women, the government can consider 
targeted programs that combine counseling, training, job-search assistance, intermediation 
and subsidized internship. Evaluations show that this type of integrated package can have 
positive impacts on labor market outcomes while being cost-effective (see Jovenes programs 
in Latin America and Malawi Youth Employment Program).55 The following 
recommendations in terms of design and implementation can be taken into account:  
 
 Delivery. The proposal is to have a system that operates through ‘one-stop shops’ 
that could be public or private employment offices—including NGOs. These would be 
the interface between applicants, counselors and training providers to provide 
assistance on job search, skills training and counseling according to participants’ 
needs and competency. The offices, in some cases (e.g. the case of unskilled, low 
income youth), would be expected to develop outreach activities to bring individuals 
into the programs. It would be important that the training or counseling is tailored to 
each applicant, training packages (combination of technical and life skills, for 
instance) are designed as needed, and training providers are selected based on 
competency. 
 
 Governance. In terms of governance, it is important to avoid excessive centralization, 
give local offices the flexibility to manage their programs, and outsource 
                                                          
55 For example, Chile’s Joven program increased female youth’s employment by 21 percent and Colombia’s 
Jovenes en Accion increased participants’ earnings by 18 percent (men) to 35 percent (women). See Sanchez-
Puerta et al. (forthcoming). 
Second Chance Training Programs: Skills Development Council (SDC) Box 4 
The SDC, established in 1980’s, significantly upgraded their activities since 2002, when the current form of 
Tripartite (Employers, Employees and Government) was formed in partnership with international 
organizations (The Bank and ILO) and Employers’ Federation of Pakistan (EFP). The SDC‘s main 
responsibilities include regionally delivering training programs and developing National Vocational 
Qualification under the approval of National Training Board. The SDC has been providing training and 
awarding nationally recognizable certificates for those who pass their qualification tests including their 
trainees.  
 
The main differences of SDC Lahore’s training from that of Punjab TVETA (Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training Authority) lie in the areas of target group, private sector involvement and 
employment placement. Unlike TVETA that requires 8 to 10 years of education, SDC’s training programs are 
focused on uneducated population. Their curriculum and pedagogical methods are accommodated for a 
large number of illiterate participants. The type of occupation under their training program tends to focus 
on, though not limited to, manufacturing. Depending on the profession and participants’ proficiency, the 
duration of training can vary from one month to one year. SDC is an autonomous body and its financing is 
based on fee for training and accreditation, independent from government subsidies. Their role in providing 
training is to facilitate private sector (associations of particular industries or professions) participation in 
identifying skills gap and designing training programs, to invite private training institutes to participate in 
fee-based training programs, and to link the trainees to employers. As a result, their programs are known to 
have high employment placement compared to other training institutions. 
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implementation to public and private companies through contracts that reward 
performance. The latter should meet clearly defined standards regarding the 
qualifications of staff, particularly for counselors, and abide by certain protocols 
regarding the methods to assess competencies and aptitudes, provide career advice 
and identify training needs.  
 
 Financing and payment systems. The assumption has usually been that training-
related ALMPs are to be financed exclusively through governmental subsidies. This 
can be the desired arrangement in the case of low-skill/low-income workers with no 
or limited savings capacity and for whom capital market restrictions or information 
constraints are particularly severe. Like in the case of TVET, payments to providers 
would be made on the basis of services delivered and placement results. Introducing 
performance-based financing (e.g. Nepal’s employment fund) or training vouchers 
(e.g. Kenya’s Technical and Vocational Vouchers Program) allocated directly to 
individuals who can then choose providers, will also lead to more relevant training. 
 
 Administration. The administrative complexity of well designed training related 
ALMPs should not be underestimated. Key processes include: registering applicants; 
contracting employment offices and training providers; setting up tariffs; managing 
individual contributions and/or credit lines; reimbursing providers. It is thus 
indispensable to build institutional capacity within the public agencies in charge of 
the management of the system at the central and local levels. Strengthening 
institutional coordination and the ability to manage multi-service programs can be 
important for reducing operational costs.  
 
Supporting Entrepreneurship  
 
61. As discussed above, self-employment and micro-entrepreneurship will continue to be 
an important source of jobs in Pakistan. The government needs to consider interventions to 
both, support those who are already working in order to improve the productivity and 
earnings of their activity—or help them transit into a different activity if the current one is 
not economically viable, and support those transiting into self-employment for the first time.  
 
62. Unfortunately, interventions which are more relevant for supporting self-
employment and entrepreneurship have received less attention and relatively little is known 
about their effectiveness. These policies attempt to influence: motivation and risk tolerance 
(via cultural and social norms); technical and non-cognitive skills; information about 
production technologies, best management practices and prices; access to value chains and 
markets; and liquidity constraints. Interventions of this sort include business and life skills 
training, advisory services, networking, improving access to finance and micro-franchising. 
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63. It is difficult to extract reproducible lessons from the evidence given the large 
heterogeneity of programs and the fact that they typically comprise a package of 
interventions. Randomized control trials carried out on a sample of microfinance clients in 
Peru56, Tanzania57, Bosnia-Herzegovina58, Dominican Republic59 and Pakistan60 found that 
business training improved business knowledge and business practices, but there is little 
evidence of an impact on sales, profits or survival rates. Moreover, introducing microfinance 
in new areas affects the creation and ownership of new business but not employment among 
current businesses.61 Evaluations of youth programs that provide entrepreneurial skills show 
that much depends on curriculum, pedagogical approach and whether participants have to 
actually start a business or not.62 For example, an evaluation of Argentina’s 
Microemprendimientos Productivos, which targeted welfare beneficiaries from a large safety 
net intervention, reports that the intervention failed to increase income for the average 
participant in the short-run.63 Some evaluations of matching grants for SMEs in Argentina64 
and Tunisia show positive results on employment creation but the results are less 
straightforward in Mauritius.65 Mentoring for SMEs in Mexico led to large, but imprecisely 
measured, increases in profits and sales, but no increase in employment over one year.66 
Counseling to improve management practices in India increased productivity by 11 percent 
and annual profits by over USD 200,000 per firm, but induced no significant change in 
employment in the first year.67 In general, most results measure impacts over the short run; 
little is known about the medium-term impact of these programs. 
 
64. There are nonetheless some promising interventions especially for youth. A recent 
meta analysis using 37 impact evaluation studies on the entrepreneurship programs found 
that the impacts of different combinations of interventions vary depending on the outcomes 
of interest and target groups.68 But among youth, access to finance tends to have larger 
impacts than other interventions in improving labor market activity, while business training 
can contribute to increased earnings and better business practices. Interventions that focus 
on increasing the productivity, integration, resistance to shocks and competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector also merit more attention. Some of the interventions targeting this sector 
include programs that promote access to finance, facilitate the adoption of new technologies, 
help upward movements in the value chain, improve the use of fertilizers and seeds, provide 
information about prices and quality standards, ease access to insurance to manage risk, 
provide assistance for the formation of producer networks and promote skill development.69 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 See Karlan and Valdivia (2011).  
57 See Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010). 
58 See Bruhn and Zia (2011).  
59 See Drexler, Fisher and Schoar (2011).  
60 See Mansuri and Gine (2011). 
61 See Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan, 2009. 
62 For the case of the Netherlands see Oosterbeek, Van Praag and Ijsselstein (2010). For Botswana, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, South Africa and Tunisia, see Africa Competitiveness Report (2011). 
63 See Almeida and Galasso (2009). 
64 See Castillo et al. (2010). 
65 See Biggs (1999) 
66 See Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar (2011).  
67 See Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts (2011). 
68 See Cho and Maddalena (2012). 
69 See World Bank (2007c).  
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65. Pakistan’s own National Rural Support Program (NRSP) provides a good example of 
successful entrepreneurship program that targets youth (See Box 4). The NRSP reaches out 
to unskilled, uneducated rural youth living in poverty, taking advantage of an existing 
network of community organizers to identify eligible households in rural communities. In 
recognition of their mobility constraints, NRSP provides full accommodation at the nearest 
city center so that the participants can fully concentrate on training during the training 
period lasting up to three months. This gives equitable opportunities to women and 
consequently half of the participants are female in the NRSP. The program provides 
vocational training in diverse occupations as well as life skills training, and additionally 
accommodates business skills training and microfinance for those who aim to become 
entrepreneurs. The Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA) can be 
also benchmarked to promote growth of micro and small enterprises (See Box 5)—and after 
evaluation could be expanded. 
 
66. These entrepreneurship interventions as well as targeted ALMPs are promising 
especially to increase female labor force participation when tailored to address their specific 
needs. Programs can combine skills training, mentoring and psychosocial support as well as 
social services such as family planning, child care and health services, for example. An 
impact evaluation study on the Adolescent girls’ initiatives implemented in Liberia found 
that entrepreneurial training combined with mentoring and life skills training significantly 
improved their employment rates (68 percent for treatment group vs. 34 percent for control 
group). Also programs targeted for female microcredit clients and entrepreneurs in the 
region such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka appear to be effective in empowering women 
through improving their earnings opportunities.70 Targeted investment in child care through 
publicly subsidized centers can also increase women’s participation.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 See Pitt et al (2006) for entrepreneurship program in Bangladesh; De Mel et al. (2008) for Sri Lanka. 
71 Examples include Estancias Infantiles in Mexico and Hogares Comunitarios in Colombia.  
National Rural Support Program (NRSP) Box 5 
The National Rural Support Program has a great potential to reach out to the majority of vulnerable youth 
who are uneducated, unskilled and mobility constrained. It provides a fast track (5 to 90 days) vocational 
and technical training to members of families living in poverty in rural areas. Currently, they provide 
training for about 90 different trades that are identified through market survey and feedback from 
partners.  
 
There are a few distinguishable features of this program. First, due to the expansive nature of rural support 
program, they take advantage of network of community organizers (COs) to identify eligible households and 
individuals, facilitate their participation in the program, and conduct monitoring and evaluation of the 
results. This enables the program to better reach the needy households than passively waiting for them to 
approach. Second, the program provides a full boarding and lodging during the training period as well as 
transport service between the hostels and the training centers. For this reason, about a half of participants 
are women who otherwise would have been constrained in their mobility. Also, because they receive 
intensive training with little absence during their stay in the program, the participants can develop skills 
within a fairly short period of time. Third, the program combines vocational training with entrepreneurship 
and life skills training in order to open a possibility toward self employment. Finally, in recognition of credit 
constraints as a main barrier to self employment, they provide guidance and microcredit for potential 
entrepreneurs. The organizational structure of the NRSP that includes separate training and microfinance 
institutes made it possible for those who receive training to benefit from entrepreneurial support and 
finance. 
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67. Looking forward, the following efforts should be further made to promote 
entrepreneurial activities, particularly for youth, by which more and better jobs can flourish 
in Pakistan: 
 Identify appropriate target groups (e.g. youth, women, microfinance clients with 
limited knowledge, off farm workers in rural areas and low productivity firms) and 
examine the constraints they face.  
 Design intervention tools and entrepreneurship programs to address the specific 
constraints of targeted group.  
 Strategize the plan for rigorous evaluation of a program before its onset and identify 
implementation issues that determine the success of the program. 
 Assess the cost effectiveness of the program and consider alternative design or 
modifications for a more effective program. 
 
Public Works and Services 
 
68. Pakistan should consider direct interventions to create jobs both for unskilled and 
skilled workers. Programs to create jobs for low income/unskilled workers through Public 
Works are quite common in middle and low income countries, and proved important to 
mitigate the impacts of the recent financial crisis.72 Less is known about programs that target 
the high-end of the skills spectrum. These would include jobs for social workers, teachers, 
health service providers, or IT specialists offered directly by the governments or through 
NGOs. Relative to the other two types of interventions public works and services can have a 
much larger effect on employment.  
 
69. Among the programs targeted to low skilled workers budgets have ranged between 
0.5% and 4% of GDP reaching up to 18% of the labor force. India’s National Rural 
                                                          
72 See Banerji, Newhouse and Robalino (forthcoming). 
SMEDA’s Industry Cluster based Public Private Partnership Box 6 
The Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA) under the ministry of Industry and 
Production, established in 1998, has been delivering comprehensive SME services throughout all the 
regions in Pakistan. The services include training, business plan development, accounting and financial 
services, legal contracting and consulting, and so on. 
 
The distinguishable and promising features of SMEDA’s activities are that they provide customized support 
based on each industry cluster and area. Each cluster, be they agribusiness, carpet, food, furniture or 
livestock, strategizes its own business based on market feasibility analysis, which examines the 
marketability and connectivity of a certain business activity as well as general profiles of employment, skills, 
and facilities at district level. Individual businesses are often matched with others for partnership and joint 
venture through SMEDA’s matchmaking services. Then SMEDA facilitates access to information, technology, 
market, training and finance so that enterprises in each cluster and business community can collectively 
execute their business plans. 
 
This approach seems to be effective to take advantage of economies of scale in addressing major 
constraints to SME business, to strengthen the value chain linkages within industry and to diversify business 
activities. Similar service can further be expanded to microenterprises to benefit the large majority of 
companies. 
Labor Market Policies Under a Youth Bulge 
 
32 
32 
 
 
Employment Guarantee scheme (NREGS)73 for instance, accounts for 2.3 percent of total 
central government spending and 0.3 percent of GDP. Between April 2007 and March 2008, 
the program created an average of 50 days of work for 33.7 million households, or roughly 25 
percent of all rural Indian households.74 Ethiopia established the Productive Safety Net 
Program (PSNP) in 2005, of which the primary component was a rural public works 
program. This is one of the larger safety net programs in Africa, as it reached more than 7 
million people—about 18 percent of the labor force—over two years with an annual budget of 
nearly $500 million, or about 4 percent of GDP. An evaluation finds that participants, 
compared to similar controls, were slightly more likely to start a non-farm business.75 
Another example is Argentina’s jefes y jefas, introduced in response to the economic crisis in 
2002. The program benefited roughly 2 million households by late 2002. The total cost of 
the program amounted to about 1 percent of GDP. The program was estimated to increase 
employment by about 1.7 percent of the population and 2.6 percent of the labor force, about 
half of whom were previously inactive.76  
 
70. In the past decade, public works programs have become one of the primary 
instruments that provide transient work opportunities in response to crisis (e.g. Argentina in 
2002, Republic of Korea in 1997). However, the agenda is evolving as they increasingly aim 
to move beyond temporary safety nets during crisis and to contribute to sustainable 
employment opportunities. More recent programs—public works plus—have incorporated a 
number of design and operational innovations to create a pathway out of poverty, linking 
beneficiaries to employment and community services and helping them increase earnings 
and build assets. These programs include public works in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Bangladesh 
among others. These examples, as well as India’s NREGS, show the potential of public works 
program as a means to create large number of jobs and build community assets and 
infrastructure.  
 
71. Two examples of programs targeted to skilled workers that have been evaluated are 
found in the US (Americorps) and Canada (Youth Service). These programs provide a small 
stipend to skilled participants in return for the opportunity to contribute to national or 
community development. Evaluations of Americorps show mixed results, although selected 
projects had a substantial net benefit, including in terms of more positive attitudes towards 
employment.77 Youth Service in Canada reportedly had positive effects on post-program 
employment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73 This provides 100 days of unskilled wage employment per year, working on small-scale road construction, 
water supply, flood protection and similar public projects. 
74 See Ravi and Engler (2009). 
75 See Gilligan, Hoddinot and Taffesse (2009).   
76 See Galasso and Ravallion (2004). Note that estimates only apply to 27 urban areas to preserve comparability 
with the labor force survey in Argentina.  
77 See Frumkin et al (2009).   
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Workers Protection 
 
72. Labor regulations and social insurance programs are important public policy 
instruments for protecting workers from abuse, discrimination and various social and 
economic risks. Labor regulations provide legislative requirements that employers and 
employees must comply with for commencing or terminating, as well as during the period of 
employment. They are designed to give balanced bargaining power between employers and 
employees; they also establish rules to prevent practices that society considers abusive and 
unacceptable. Thus, they aim to protect workers from arbitrary, unfair, or discriminatory 
actions by their employers, while protecting employers against arbitrary industrial action by 
workers and their unions.78 Social insurance (SI) programs, on the other hand, cover risks 
such as health, disability, unemployment or longevity. The rationale for having these 
programs is for individuals to collectively cope with the risks because many individuals may 
not have the ability to adequately self-insure against these risks due to ‘myopia’, liquidity 
constraints and imperfections in capital and insurance markets.79  
 
73. Pakistan’s both labor regulations and social insurance programs face problems in 
terms of design that reduce their effectiveness as well as creating distortions that can affect 
the expansion of formal sector. This section discusses some of the main problems and 
solutions focusing on hiring and dismissal procedures, minimum wages and pensions.  
 
74. Hiring and Dismissal Procedures: Pakistan has been involved in important reforms 
aiming to integrate and simplify labor regulation80 and make them more business friendly, 
but with the process of devolution they have come to a halt. The provinces are now 
responsible for devising their own regulations (each of them, for instance, is developing its 
own Industrial Relations Act, IRA), and for the time being the legislation that was supposed 
to be reformed continues to apply. Provincial IRAs do not necessarily adopt the ILO 
conventions, although the government of Pakistan ratified them.  
 
75. Overall, Pakistan has very rigid labor regulation when it comes to hiring and 
dismissal procedures.81 Employers have little flexibility in choosing the type of contract. The 
use of fixed term contracts for permanent activities, for instance, is forbidden in Pakistan 
whereas only 20 percent of EAP countries and 30 percent of other SA countries prohibit this. 
Also, the maximum lengths of fixed term contracts are lower than other countries in the 
region. This means that employers have to make decisions between a lay-off and change of 
the contract to an open-ended one only after 9 months of experience. The cost of dismissal 
related to severance pay seems to be particularly serious for Pakistan. The cost of dismissing 
an employee with 10 years of tenure, for example, is to pay 43 weeks of salaries, which is 
substantially high compared to only 14 weeks in ECA or 18 weeks in MENA. The high and 
steep severance payment schedule, rapidly increasing with the tenure of workers in Pakistan, 
may make labor mobility and transitions even harder. Also, the overall worker protection 
                                                          
78 The main aspects of labor regulations include: (i) entry into employment contract (mandatory provisions of 
employment contracts, probation period); (ii) terms of employment contract, including fixed-term contracts, part 
time employment, and working hours; (iii) paid and unpaid leave, maternity leave, and family leave; (iv) wages 
and benefits including minimum wages; and (v) contract termination, including notification and approval by a 
third party, advance notice, mandatory (re)training and severance payments. 
79 See Barr (2004). 
80 The proposal was to consolidate from 70 to 5 simplified laws. 
81 See Annexure 11 and 12 for comparison of labor regulation across South Asian countries and other Low Middle 
Income Countries. 
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measures show that Pakistan’s regulation is poorly designed especially in providing 
employment protection and personal and gender needs when compared to other Lower 
Medium Income Countries (LMICs) (See Annexure 12). 
 
76. Rigid regulation can increase transaction costs, reduce incentives to invest, and thus 
discourage job creation. International evidence shows, though arguably, that labor 
regulations aimed at providing job security reduce turnover, lead to creation of fewer jobs, 
and may slow productivity growth.82 For example, studies from Latin America (Colombia, 
Brazil and Peru) show that job protection is correlated with lower turnover83, and longer job 
tenure more generally. Also, there is growing evidence that rigid labor regulations can 
negatively affect productivity growth by increasing the cost of labor adjustments and 
reducing the incentives that firms have to innovate and adopt new, especially labor-saving, 
technologies.84 Therefore, ensuring flexibility of labor law, without harnessing firms’ 
incentive to invest in human capital and hire more workers while promoting basic worker 
protection, is needed.  
 
77. Minimum Wage (MW): Pakistan introduced the national minimum wage for 
unskilled workers in 1992 at 1,650 PKR (about 27 USD) per month.85 The mechanism to 
adjust the minimum wage is discretionary, which imposes uncertainty on both employees 
and employers. Since its inception the minimum wage has been increased only five times.86 
Today Pakistan’s minimum wage as a share of value added is close to the median of the 
international distribution.87 However, the minimum wage (PKR 6,000 as of 2008) is almost 
71 percent of the average monthly earnings (PKR 8,508) and 95 percent of the median 
monthly earnings (PKR 6,300). This level of the minimum wage is quite high and is likely 
forcing several firms to evade (or reduce formal employment). This, in a way, would make 
the minimum wage irrelevant.  
 
78. Low coverage and enforcement of the minimum wage adds obscurity in the relevance 
of the system. The proportion of wage and salaried workers below the minimum wage is 
about 42 percent, but widely varies by sector and workers’ characteristics (See Annexure 
14).88 For example, even among formal sector workers, only 11 percent of public 
administration workers are below the minimum wage while almost 40 percent of those 
                                                          
82 See Kuddo (2009) for a review of literature. 
83 Kugler (1999), Gonzaga (2003) and Saavedra and Torero (2000).  
84 See Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) for an analysis using a general equilibrium model of job search; Cappelli 
(2000) and Hobjin and Jovanovic (2001) for analyses of the impact on the cost of labor adjustments; and 
Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) for direct effects on productivity growth. 
85 The minimum wage in Pakistan is governed by the Minimum Wage Ordinance in 1961 and West Pakistan 
Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers in 1969. Although they were enacted in 1960’s, they did not make any 
efforts to set or adjust workers wages according to the living standard and there was no specified national 
minimum wage until 1992. See Irfan (2008). 
86 During the recent five years, the minimum wage has been increased almost every year: PKR 4,000 in 2006, 
PKR 4,600 in 2007, PKR 6,000 in 2008 and PKR 7,000 in 2010. According to the Minimum Wage Ordinance in 
1961 which lays out the rule for minimum wage, whenever there are changes in economic conditions and cost of 
living, Minimum Wage Board can convene and adjust the level of the minimum wage and recommend it to the 
provincial government. Board members comprise independent chair, representatives from employers and 
employees respectively and are appointed by provincial government. 
87 Pakistan’s minimum wage is about 30 percent of average added value by a worker, and is placed at about 30th 
percentile. See Annexure 13. 
88 Given that the minimum wage applies only to regular unskilled workers in formal firms, the proportion of 
workers below the minimum wage is disaggregated by regularity, formality and education. Regular workers are 
those with monthly payment vis-à-vis casual workers whose payment is piecemeal. Formal workers are those who 
work in registered firms, and low educated workers are those with no education. 
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working in manufacturing have wages lower than minimum wage. When plotted, the wage 
distribution for each sector does not reveal any discontinuity around the minimum wage, 
which suggests that the policy is not applied or enforced for the majority of workers (See 
Annexure 15).  
 
79. Pensions: Like in the case of many developing countries, Pakistan’s pension system 
faces challenges in terms of coverage, financial sustainability and labor market incentives. 
The system was introduced in 1976 under the Employees’ Old age Benefits Institute 
(EOBI).89 90 It is a pay-as-you-go system where employers with 5 and more employees are 
required to enroll (participation is voluntary for smaller firms and the self employed). For 
each registered worker, the employer is required to pay 5 percent of the minimum wage and 
the worker pays its 1 percent; a self employed worker pays 6 percent of the minimum wage 
for his or her benefits.91 Then the benefit is calculated based on the minimum wage and the 
number of years of contribution, and can be disbursed after minimum 15 years of service at 
retirement age of 60 (55 for female workers).92 Due to a large informal economy, today, 
about 84 thousand firms and 4.7 million workers (out of 46 million workers) are registered 
in pension program, and 3.8 million workers are receiving benefits as of June, 2011. As the 
contribution and benefits are set at the national minimum wage at the time of transaction 
which creates uncertainty in their benefits compared to the contribution, there is little 
incentive to comply to participate in the system or to work hard to increase their wage rates 
for the sake of higher pension benefits. In addition, although about PKR 200 billion is 
accumulated under EOBI fund, and demographic structure is still favorable to pay-as-you-go 
system, implicit liability is larger than the currently projected revenue.  
 
80. To complicate things more, the devolution of July 2011 supposedly conveys the 
administration of pension to each provinces and the transferability of pension system across 
provinces is unclear. While the devolution was timed, as of June 2011, concrete plans to 
establish pension agencies in each province, ensure transferability of pension for labor 
mobility, and manage pension funds according to each province’s labor force and 
demographic structure were not yet defined. With different size of labor force and economic 
situation across four provinces, the current plan that envisages independent management of 
the pension system is likely to reduce the size of the risk pool of the system. 
 
81. In order to provide and expand worker protection the following policy reforms should 
be considered:  
 
 Labor Regulations: Beyond pursuing flexibility, there is a need for integration, 
simplification and better enforcement. In most developing countries, inspection 
offices do not have the capacity to enforce the many regulations found in different 
pieces of legislation. Societies thus need to prioritize the areas where labor markets 
need to be regulated and try to extend these basic rights to informal sector wage 
earners. These priorities would include, for instance, the enforcement of core labor 
                                                          
89 See Mahmood and Nashir (2008) for the history of the social security system in Pakistan.  
90 In addition to the pension system administered by the EOBI, there are other small scale programs provided for 
formal sector workers; workers welfare fund, provincial social security, and workers’ profit participation fund. 
For more information, see World Bank (2007b). 
91 For simplicity of administration, the EOBI uses the national minimum wage as a reference wage level for all 
workers. 
92 Separate rules are applied for disability and survival pension benefits. 
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standards (freedom of association, no forced labor, no child labor and no 
discrimination) and working conditions (work schedules, health and safety). Lower 
priority areas might be regulating contracts or dismissal procedures beyond requiring 
appropriate advance notice. While relaxing restrictions in the use of short-term 
contracts and dismissal procedures Pakistan could gradually introduce a system of 
unemployment benefits that replaces severance pay.  
 
 Minimum Wage: The mechanism to set the minimum wage needs to be 
reexamined.93 The main objective is to reduce discretion by giving the mandate to 
periodically adjust the minimum wage to an independent Technical Commission 
(TC)—similar to the recently created Minimum Wage Commission in Malaysia. The 
TC would comprise technical experts and representatives from employees, employers 
and the government. Its mandate would be to adjust the minimum wage at pre-
determined dates based on a given formula taking into account considerations such 
as the cost of living, productivity growth, and the share of workers and firms affected. 
The recommendations from the technical commission would still need an approval by 
the government to take effect. However, the government cannot impose a minimum 
wage that is not agreed by the TC.  
 
 Social Insurance: The main reform in the case of pensions would be to move to a 
system based on defined contributions—even if it remains pay-as-you-go—that 
guarantees the portability of pension rights across provinces. All plan members 
would have individual accounts that register the contributions they make and the 
interest they accrue. Upon retirement, the funds registered in the individual account 
would be transformed into an annuity that depends on life expectancy. To protect 
individual with limited saving capacity the government should introduce targeted 
subsidies to top up their benefits and/or contributions. The rate of return on the 
individual accounts would depend on the structure of the assets that back the 
liabilities—a combination of financial assets (including tradable government bonds) 
and pay-as-you-go assets (the present value of future contribution net of the benefits 
accruing from those contributions). The proposed system has two virtues. First it is 
expandable to the informal sector because the link between contribution and benefits 
gives flexibility regarding the level and frequency of individual payments—without 
compromising financial sustainability. Second, it gives flexibility to the provinces to 
decide how assets are invested and the level and forms of the subsidies are allocated 
to the system (although ideally would be defined by the federal government to avoid 
the potential fragmentation of labor markets).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 See Cho et al. (forthcoming). 
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Annexure 1 – Decomposition of GDP per Capita94 
 
The first part comes from a decomposition of GDP per capita growth into the growth in 
productivity, employment and working age population. Let GDP per capita, denoted by y be 
the GDP divided by total population:       where   and   presents GDP and population 
respectively. The following equation shows how the decomposition can be expressed: 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where   and  represents the employed and working age population, respectively. Then the 
output per worker, 
 
 
  denotes labor productivity, the employed over working population, 
 
 
, 
denotes employment ratio, and the working age population over total population, 
 
 
, denotes 
the proportion of working age population.  
 
Taking log of each side of the equation (1) gives: 
  
(2)    (
 
 
)     (
 
 
)     (
 
 
)     (
 
 
) 
 
which means that the percentage growth in GDP per capita over a period is linearly 
decomposed with the percentage growth in output per labor, employment ratio and share of 
working age population. This yields Table 2 in the text.  
 
When it comes to the number of employed, E, note that this is a sum of each sector workers 
(  ):   ∑    
  
    ∑    
  
    where    is a sector share and    denotes the number of sectors 
of consideration (in our case 3: agriculture, industry, and service). Let   denote the overall 
employment ratio (   ) and    denote share of workers in sector   among working age 
population        , then   ∑   
  
   . This translates into    ∑    
  
   . The percentage 
points increments of employment ratio is simply the sum of increments of each sector share 
among working age population, which yields Table 3. 
 
Output per worker, 
 
 
, can be also decomposed taking sector productivity (
  
  
) and sector 
share (   
  
 
) into account. Note that 
 
 
 ∑
  
  
  
   
  
 
. Let   
 
 
 and    
  
  
 denote overall and 
sector-specific labor productivity. Then the following equation holds for any points of a 
period: 
 
(3)   ∑     
  
   . 
 
Using the shapely decomposition, taking the difference of equation (3) over two time points 
yields 
 
(4)    ∑    
 
  ̅   ̅    
  
    . 
 
The first term of the right hand side of equation (4) shows the counterfactual productivity 
change under constant sector distribution only explained by sector specific productivity 
                                                          
94 For a detailed explanation, refer to World Bank (2006) and Shorrocks, A. F. (1999). 
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changes. The second term shows the contribution of sectoral reallocation holding the sector 
specific productivity constant. Therefore overall productivity change can be disaggregated 
into changes of sector-specific productivity and changes in sectoral shares due to inter-
sectoral mobility. The counterfactual of column (4) of Table 4 shows productivity changes 
assuming sector distribution at the average share of each sector over the two periods. 
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Annexure 2A – Summary Statistics – Urban Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban Areas
Labor 
Force
Wage 
employed
Formality
Informal
Regular 
wage 
Casual 
wage 
Employer
Self 
Employed
Family 
Workers
Primary
Manufact
uring
Construct
ion
Commerce
Transport
ation and 
finance
Public
Other 
service
ALL 47.2% 44.1% 6.6% 74.3% 36.2% 18.8% 3.1% 30.3% 11.6% 5.8% 23.7% 7.1% 31.3% 9.8% 13.9% 8.5% 5,809.5
MALE
No education 93.4% 88.8% 4.9% 86.8% 23.0% 33.0% 1.5% 35.6% 6.9% 8.8% 23.6% 14.1% 31.3% 11.5% 5.2% 5.6% 4,143.5
Less than Primary 96.2% 92.9% 3.4% 90.1% 19.7% 26.9% 2.1% 40.3% 11.0% 5.4% 24.4% 11.7% 38.6% 10.6% 5.1% 4.1% 3,841.0
Primary 75.6% 71.5% 5.5% 81.8% 30.6% 19.2% 3.2% 34.0% 13.1% 4.3% 25.3% 6.9% 39.4% 9.7% 8.7% 5.7% 4,645.1
Secondary 68.0% 63.9% 6.1% 58.4% 48.8% 5.1% 5.0% 27.7% 13.4% 2.6% 16.8% 3.1% 37.9% 9.0% 23.7% 6.9% 6,669.8
Tertiary 87.9% 84.0% 4.4% 35.5% 67.3% 3.0% 6.4% 18.0% 5.4% 1.0% 16.5% 3.1% 19.3% 14.4% 37.6% 8.1% 11,768.1
FEMALE
No education 12.6% 10.5% 16.5% 93.1% 22.6% 24.9% 0.0% 18.9% 33.7% 31.0% 36.8% 2.2% 4.6% 0.4% 4.6% 20.6% 2,028.0
Less than Primary 13.4% 9.7% 27.3% 88.3% 7.8% 18.9% 0.0% 48.0% 25.2% 11.8% 55.9% 6.2% 6.3% 3.8% 8.2% 7.9% 1,821.4
Primary 7.8% 6.3% 19.5% 80.1% 32.3% 19.6% 0.4% 28.6% 19.1% 7.4% 51.0% 1.1% 6.1% 1.1% 13.0% 20.3% 3,022.2
Secondary 11.7% 9.2% 21.7% 55.0% 70.0% 4.0% 0.1% 17.5% 8.4% 1.5% 6.2% 0.0% 3.9% 3.5% 31.7% 53.3% 3,867.7
Tertiary 27.7% 24.3% 12.4% 36.7% 81.1% 7.9% 1.2% 7.2% 2.7% 0.0% 3.7% 0.2% 0.5% 5.8% 46.8% 43.0% 7,992.7
YOUTH
No education 49.6% 45.4% 8.5% 89.7% 24.0% 39.8% 0.3% 15.1% 20.7% 10.5% 35.4% 12.5% 25.6% 5.9% 2.0% 8.1% 3,076.2
Less than Primary 69.9% 64.1% 8.4% 92.6% 19.3% 32.9% 0.4% 22.3% 25.2% 4.2% 31.6% 12.0% 36.0% 8.5% 3.6% 4.1% 2,859.9
Primary 34.2% 30.2% 11.9% 87.4% 29.7% 25.9% 0.4% 18.1% 26.0% 4.7% 33.1% 7.5% 37.6% 7.1% 3.0% 6.9% 3,462.3
Secondary 22.3% 18.8% 15.9% 66.1% 50.7% 9.0% 0.2% 14.0% 26.1% 4.5% 17.8% 3.2% 32.9% 6.7% 14.3% 20.7% 4,519.0
Tertiary 42.5% 34.7% 18.4% 55.4% 64.6% 11.8% 2.0% 8.1% 13.5% 0.0% 12.7% 2.7% 20.3% 12.0% 19.2% 33.0% 7,265.1
ADULTS
No education 40.2% 37.7% 6.1% 87.1% 22.8% 28.8% 1.6% 38.5% 8.2% 13.2% 22.7% 12.0% 26.9% 11.0% 6.3% 7.9% 4,182.0
Less than Primary 61.1% 59.1% 3.3% 88.1% 18.9% 22.5% 3.1% 52.2% 3.4% 6.7% 22.9% 11.1% 36.8% 11.4% 6.4% 4.6% 4,516.1
Primary 59.2% 57.1% 3.4% 78.7% 31.3% 16.0% 4.3% 41.2% 7.2% 4.3% 23.8% 6.1% 37.2% 10.2% 12.0% 6.4% 5,187.8
Secondary 61.4% 58.1% 5.5% 55.6% 51.3% 3.8% 5.8% 30.4% 8.7% 1.9% 15.2% 2.6% 34.9% 8.7% 27.7% 9.0% 6,852.2
Tertiary 68.9% 66.4% 3.6% 32.6% 70.6% 2.7% 6.0% 17.0% 3.7% 0.9% 14.6% 2.6% 15.3% 13.1% 42.1% 11.3% 11,552.7
Note: Based on LFS 2009. Statistics are for working age population
All
Monthly 
earnings 
(PKR)
LFP
Employm
ent
Employment status Employment sector
Unemplo
yment
Employed
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Annexure 2B – Summary Statistics – Rural Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rural Areas
Labor 
Force
Wage 
employed
Formality
Informal
Regular 
wage 
Casual 
wage 
Employer
Self 
Employed
Family 
Workers
Primary
Manufactu
ring
Constructi
on
Commerce
Transporta
tion and 
finance
Public
Other 
service
ALL 58.3% 55.8% 4.4% 91.1% 13.3% 15.7% 0.4% 36.0% 34.5% 59.9% 8.6% 6.9% 10.3% 4.9% 6.0% 3.3% 4,163.8
MALE
No education 95.3% 92.8% 2.5% 95.9% 8.8% 21.0% 0.3% 49.7% 20.2% 63.5% 7.4% 10.2% 9.0% 5.6% 1.9% 2.3% 3,771.9
Less than Primary 96.3% 92.7% 3.7% 93.3% 12.5% 21.8% 0.9% 41.6% 23.3% 50.0% 11.2% 11.1% 13.5% 7.5% 3.4% 3.3% 3,631.0
Primary 80.2% 77.0% 4.0% 88.9% 17.5% 15.9% 0.6% 40.7% 25.2% 45.8% 10.1% 9.2% 17.4% 7.7% 6.5% 3.4% 4,366.8
Secondary 76.8% 72.7% 5.3% 62.7% 41.4% 5.6% 0.7% 36.0% 16.4% 30.1% 6.6% 3.7% 15.3% 5.2% 32.4% 6.8% 5,738.5
Tertiary 90.0% 86.3% 4.1% 38.3% 64.6% 2.5% 2.1% 22.8% 8.0% 15.6% 3.3% 0.8% 9.5% 4.4% 56.2% 10.3% 7,645.8
FEMALE
No education 33.9% 32.0% 5.5% 99.6% 1.2% 10.6% 0.0% 12.4% 75.7% 89.8% 7.1% 0.2% 0.9% 0.0% 0.1% 1.7% 1,885.2
Less than Primary 28.2% 26.0% 7.7% 97.8% 3.3% 12.6% 0.0% 16.0% 68.2% 77.2% 19.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.0% 0.9% 1.6% 1,519.9
Primary 18.6% 16.4% 11.8% 91.9% 9.8% 11.9% 0.1% 16.3% 62.0% 68.2% 17.0% 0.5% 2.8% 0.2% 7.2% 4.0% 2,634.5
Secondary 23.2% 18.8% 18.8% 55.1% 65.1% 5.7% 0.9% 13.6% 14.8% 13.8% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 42.2% 35.0% 3,525.7
Tertiary 46.5% 35.8% 23.1% 35.0% 76.8% 1.2% 0.8% 11.6% 9.5% 6.3% 2.1% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 53.3% 37.6% 5,558.3
YOUTH
No education 54.3% 52.2% 3.8% 97.9% 5.6% 20.4% 0.0% 9.6% 64.3% 72.4% 9.7% 7.5% 5.3% 3.0% 0.4% 1.8% 2,835.4
Less than Primary 69.2% 64.8% 6.4% 96.2% 11.0% 24.1% 0.0% 19.1% 45.8% 52.3% 16.4% 10.1% 11.4% 5.9% 0.6% 3.4% 2,956.5
Primary 45.0% 41.1% 8.7% 93.7% 12.5% 19.3% 0.2% 18.0% 50.0% 52.3% 13.4% 9.6% 13.8% 5.8% 1.9% 3.1% 3,429.6
Secondary 38.1% 32.3% 15.3% 81.3% 31.9% 8.5% 0.2% 25.9% 33.6% 37.6% 10.7% 4.6% 14.2% 5.9% 12.6% 14.3% 3,197.9
Tertiary 51.2% 39.7% 22.6% 62.8% 55.1% 4.8% 0.7% 16.9% 22.5% 18.9% 4.3% 0.2% 11.1% 6.1% 25.6% 33.8% 3,920.2
ADULTS
No education 55.6% 53.7% 3.4% 97.1% 6.0% 16.0% 0.2% 42.6% 35.2% 74.3% 6.5% 6.0% 6.0% 3.6% 1.5% 2.2% 3,605.8
Less than Primary 75.4% 73.4% 2.7% 92.0% 11.6% 18.5% 1.3% 51.5% 17.1% 54.3% 9.2% 9.7% 11.6% 7.2% 5.1% 2.9% 3,977.2
Primary 76.9% 75.1% 2.3% 86.5% 19.5% 13.4% 0.8% 50.1% 16.2% 45.0% 9.1% 7.7% 17.5% 7.7% 9.3% 3.6% 4,731.0
Secondary 82.3% 79.8% 3.1% 54.0% 48.8% 4.5% 0.9% 36.4% 9.4% 24.4% 5.3% 2.6% 13.6% 4.1% 42.0% 7.9% 6,089.2
Tertiary 86.7% 83.1% 4.2% 33.7% 68.2% 2.0% 2.1% 21.9% 5.9% 13.4% 2.9% 0.8% 7.8% 3.4% 60.8% 11.0% 7,775.6
Note: Based on LFS 2009. Statistics are for working age population 
Monthly 
earnings 
(PKR)
All
LFP
Employme
nt
Unemploy
ment
Employment status Employment sector
Employed
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Annexure 3A – Determinants of Labor Force Participation by Gender & 
Region 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Probit regression is estimated separately by gender and region. Omitted variables include ‘no education 
group’, ‘Punjab province’, ‘non-married’, and ‘year 2000’. The numbers represent the marginal effects with standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Urban Rural Urban Rural
Age 0.0705*** 0.0365*** 0.0201*** 0.0186***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age squared -0.0009*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than 0.0611*** 0.0187*** -0.0059*** -0.0483***
primary (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary 0.0057*** -0.0262*** -0.0264*** -0.1031***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lower -0.1283*** -0.1343*** -0.0388*** -0.1295***
Secondary (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-University -0.2174*** -0.2208*** 0.0412*** -0.0275***
and above (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sindh 0.0102*** 0.0269*** -0.0591*** -0.1256***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NWFP -0.0370*** -0.0380*** -0.0439*** -0.1637***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Balochistan -0.0480*** -0.0146*** -0.0485*** -0.1731***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num. of children 0.0040*** -0.0003*** -0.0007*** -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num. of elderly -0.0093*** -0.0021*** -0.0044*** -0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.0989*** 0.0695*** -0.1066*** -0.0303***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2002 0.0215*** 0.0016*** 0.0282*** 0.0080***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2004 0.0157*** 0.0092*** 0.0269*** 0.0527***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2007 0.0295*** 0.0138*** 0.0215*** 0.1149***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2008 0.0243*** 0.0109*** 0.0083*** 0.1334***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2009 0.0248*** 0.0137*** 0.0252*** 0.1464***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R squared 0.312 0.264 0.082 0.068
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Male Female
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Annexure 3B – Determinants of Unemployment by Gender & Region 
 
 
 
Notes: Probit regression is estimated separately by gender and region. Omitted variables include ‘no education group’, 
‘Punjab province’, ‘non-married’, and ‘year 2000’. The numbers represent the marginal effects with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Urban Rural Urban Rural
Age 0.0016*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age squared -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than 0.0036*** 0.0078*** -0.0013*** 0.0012***
primary (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 0.0002*** 0.0015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lower 0.0044*** 0.0073*** 0.0006*** 0.0025***
Secondary (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-University 0.0103*** 0.0167*** 0.0059*** 0.0098***
and above (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sindh -0.0005*** -0.0041*** -0.0020*** -0.0011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NWFP 0.0139*** 0.0127*** -0.0003*** -0.0007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Balochistan 0.0000 -0.0027*** 0.0005*** -0.0006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num. of children -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0001*** -0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num. of elderly 0.0012*** 0.0004*** -0.0005*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.0208*** -0.0069*** -0.0037*** -0.0017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2002 0.0202*** 0.0113*** 0.0121*** 0.0171***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2004 0.0239*** 0.0092*** 0.0103*** 0.0175***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2007 -0.0022*** -0.0052*** 0.0005*** 0.0052***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2008 -0.0038*** -0.0051*** 0.0007*** 0.0044***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2009 -0.0021*** -0.0045*** 0.0014*** 0.0058***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R squared 0.090 0.114 0.110 0.084
Male Female
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Annexure 4 – Multinomial Logit for Employment Status by Region: Male 
 
 
 
Notes: Mutinomial logit regressions are estimated separately by gender and region. Omitted variables include ‘no 
education group’, ‘Punjab province’, ‘non-married’, and ‘year 2000’. The numbers represent the marginal effects with 
standard errors in parentheses. The base category is family workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
regular
employee
casual
employee self employed
regular
employee
casual
employee self employed
Age 0.1555*** 0.0607*** 0.1672*** 0.2533*** 0.1353*** 0.2239***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Age squared -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0006*** -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.0017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than 0.1093 -0.2374*** 0.2256*** 0.5871*** -0.0207 0.2133***
primary (0.079) (0.075) (0.077) (0.051) (0.042) (0.041)
Primary -0.1867*** -0.6811*** -0.2082*** 0.6108*** -0.1745*** 0.0822***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.029) (0.024) (0.023)
Lower -0.0194 -1.1766*** -0.3552*** 0.9643*** -0.6395*** 0.0133
Secondary (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021)
Pre-University 0.5089*** -2.5046*** -0.6696*** 2.2179*** -1.3163*** -0.0907**
and above (0.042) (0.052) (0.043) (0.040) (0.062) (0.041)
Sindh 0.4076*** 0.2773*** 0.0276 -0.2918*** -0.8551*** -0.2037***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021)
NWFP -0.0118 -0.0687 -0.1155** 0.2908*** 0.2004*** 0.0824***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
Balochistan -0.1724** -0.5587*** -0.4323*** -0.0747* -0.6296*** -0.4102***
(0.071) (0.078) (0.072) (0.042) (0.040) (0.036)
Married 0.2001*** 0.1764*** 0.5550*** 0.4665*** 0.4287*** 0.7854***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024)
year 2002 0.0777 0.3419*** 0.0093 0.1538*** 0.3355*** 0.1288***
(0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.038) (0.035) (0.031)
year 2004 -0.0345 0.1311*** -0.0324 -0.0224 0.2011*** -0.0736**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.037) (0.034) (0.030)
year 2007 0.0513 0.1911*** 0.0209 0.0440 0.2290*** -0.1201***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030)
year 2008 -0.0593 0.1002** -0.1120** 0.0144 0.1027*** -0.1368***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030)
year 2009 -0.1375*** 0.0012 -0.1989*** -0.1002*** 0.0628* -0.2720***
(0.045) (0.048) (0.046) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030)
Constant -2.8037*** -0.4666*** -3.0605*** -6.2311*** -2.7053*** -4.5884***
(0.141) (0.141) (0.144) (0.103) (0.086) (0.082)
Observations 96,228 96,228 96,228 138,430 138,430 138,430
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Male
Urban Rural
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Annexure 5 – Multinomial Logit for Employment Status by Region: Female 
 
 
Notes: Mutinomial logit regressions are estimated separately by gender and region. Omitted variables include ‘no 
education group’, ‘Punjab province’, ‘non-married’, and ‘year 2000’. The numbers represent the marginal effects with 
standard errors in parentheses. The base category is family workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
regular
employee
casual
employee self employed
regular
employee
casual
employee self employed
Age 0.2754*** 0.2021*** 0.2388*** 0.2714*** 0.0120 0.1988***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009)
Age squared -0.0032*** -0.0026*** -0.0028*** -0.0032*** -0.0004*** -0.0023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than 0.4668* 0.5494** 1.3566*** 0.8982*** 0.2140** 0.4128***
primary (0.273) (0.233) (0.231) (0.316) (0.106) (0.119)
Primary 0.0007 0.1837* 0.8651*** 1.1037*** -0.1393** 0.4327***
(0.126) (0.101) (0.105) (0.148) (0.060) (0.059)
Lower 1.7055*** 0.1582* 1.0918*** 4.0340*** -0.2221*** 0.6365***
Secondary (0.090) (0.095) (0.096) (0.088) (0.078) (0.071)
Pre-University 3.3158*** -0.0283 1.4960*** 6.1763*** -0.0201 1.3361***
and above (0.109) (0.132) (0.120) (0.125) (0.209) (0.148)
Sindh 0.4523*** 0.3104*** -0.5483*** -0.4018*** -2.1077*** -1.7995***
(0.083) (0.085) (0.100) (0.131) (0.090) (0.087)
NWFP 0.7456*** -0.4986** 0.3385* 0.6325*** -2.0661*** 0.2299***
(0.173) (0.223) (0.185) (0.094) (0.114) (0.049)
Balochistan -0.1406 -0.9979*** -1.0987*** 0.2857 -2.2624*** -0.9680***
(0.239) (0.305) (0.311) (0.231) (0.241) (0.146)
Married -0.6451*** -0.7676*** -0.5281*** -0.7576*** -0.4138*** -0.5296***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.092) (0.087) (0.044) (0.046)
year 2002 -0.4608*** -0.2151 -0.2811* -0.0496 -0.0806 0.0535
(0.146) (0.145) (0.152) (0.139) (0.060) (0.067)
year 2004 -0.7058*** -0.3982*** -0.3454** -0.0343 -0.3979*** -0.0044
(0.141) (0.141) (0.146) (0.133) (0.058) (0.062)
year 2007 -0.9728*** -0.8309*** -0.6813*** -0.6003*** -0.7702*** -0.2604***
(0.136) (0.137) (0.142) (0.130) (0.057) (0.060)
year 2008 -1.2536*** -0.9579*** -1.0599*** -0.4407*** -0.7503*** -0.2164***
(0.137) (0.137) (0.145) (0.128) (0.057) (0.060)
year 2009 -0.9563*** -0.9397*** -0.7265*** -0.7170*** -0.8652*** -0.2919***
(0.134) (0.136) (0.141) (0.129) (0.058) (0.060)
Constant -4.4488*** -2.2823*** -3.8500*** -8.4859*** -0.2908** -4.7183***
(0.323) (0.305) (0.328) (0.363) (0.142) (0.163)
Observations 10,186 10,186 10,186 35,110 35,110 35,110
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Female
Urban Rural
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Annexure 6 – Multinomial Logit for Employment Sector: Male 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES primary
manufact
uring
constructi
on
comm-
erce
transporta
tion and 
finance public primary
manufact
uring
constructi
on
comm-
erce
transporta
tion and 
finance public
Age -0.0382*** 0.0290*** 0.0504*** 0.0178*** 0.0941*** 0.2901*** -0.0126* 0.0181** 0.0608*** 0.0389*** 0.1399*** 0.3684***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Age squared 0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0002** -0.0012*** -0.0033*** 0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0010*** -0.0004*** -0.0020*** -0.0042***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than -0.6597*** -0.0830 -0.3710*** 0.0883 -0.1194 -0.0491 -0.5826*** -0.1424** -0.5314*** 0.0408 -0.1191 0.3092***
primary (0.105) (0.068) (0.084) (0.066) (0.082) (0.104) (0.059) (0.070) (0.071) (0.068) (0.075) (0.094)
Primary -0.5384*** -0.0574 -0.5422*** 0.0415 -0.2664*** 0.1550*** -0.7206*** -0.2219*** -0.5642*** 0.0659* -0.2377*** 0.4928***
(0.053) (0.037) (0.046) (0.036) (0.045) (0.053) (0.034) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.044) (0.053)
Lower -0.7774*** -0.1445*** -1.0679*** 0.2271*** -0.2853*** 0.8483*** -0.6882*** -0.3144*** -0.8769*** 0.3277*** -0.2005*** 1.6843***
Secondary (0.045) (0.031) (0.040) (0.030) (0.037) (0.041) (0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.041) (0.045)
Pre-University -1.3889*** -0.4113*** -1.6345*** -0.1205*** -0.1408*** 1.7217*** -1.7890*** -1.2518*** -2.5405*** -0.3629*** -1.2693*** 2.5276***
and above (0.063) (0.037) (0.055) (0.035) (0.042) (0.043) (0.048) (0.065) (0.088) (0.054) (0.071) (0.055)
Sindh -0.0470 0.2090*** 0.1410*** 0.1548*** 0.2013*** 0.2803*** 1.2560*** -0.0424 0.2907*** 0.7088*** 0.6025*** 1.4645***
(0.040) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.042) (0.051) (0.051) (0.046) (0.052) (0.049)
NWFP 0.1437** -0.6322*** 0.1175* -0.0650 0.1498*** 0.4780*** -0.1562*** -0.4230*** 0.3780*** 0.2290*** 0.4097*** 0.7181***
(0.070) (0.055) (0.062) (0.048) (0.057) (0.055) (0.034) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.043) (0.043)
Balochistan 1.0657*** -0.7247*** 0.4687*** 0.5167*** 0.3067*** 1.6433*** 1.2196*** -0.9094*** 0.7436*** 1.3219*** 1.1557*** 2.4821***
(0.100) (0.104) (0.103) (0.082) (0.100) (0.085) (0.084) (0.124) (0.094) (0.088) (0.095) (0.091)
Married 0.2663*** -0.0229 0.2190*** 0.1549*** 0.2689*** 0.2365*** -0.1744*** -0.1589*** -0.1946*** -0.0005 -0.0295 0.0789
(0.058) (0.037) (0.049) (0.035) (0.044) (0.045) (0.038) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.050) (0.054)
year 2002 -0.1361** -0.0008 -0.0858 0.0133 0.0609 -0.0495 -0.3541*** 0.0008 -0.0626 -0.0911* -0.0053 -0.3182***
(0.067) (0.044) (0.060) (0.042) (0.055) (0.050) (0.045) (0.056) (0.057) (0.053) (0.061) (0.059)
year 2004 -0.1178* -0.0796* -0.1321** -0.0490 0.1546*** -0.2960*** -0.2852*** 0.1129** 0.0441 0.0262 0.0237 -0.3886***
(0.065) (0.042) (0.058) (0.041) (0.052) (0.049) (0.045) (0.056) (0.056) (0.052) (0.061) (0.059)
year 2007 0.0140 0.0059 0.1953*** 0.0450 0.2573*** -0.2135*** -0.3801*** 0.1641*** 0.1373** -0.0798 0.0240 -0.5680***
(0.064) (0.042) (0.056) (0.041) (0.052) (0.049) (0.044) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.059) (0.058)
year 2008 0.0619 0.0911** 0.2559*** 0.0911** 0.3253*** -0.2054*** -0.3124*** 0.1083** 0.1498*** 0.0437 0.1562*** -0.5331***
(0.064) (0.042) (0.057) (0.041) (0.052) (0.048) (0.044) (0.055) (0.055) (0.051) (0.059) (0.058)
year 2009 0.7208*** 0.7336*** 0.9436*** 0.8958*** 0.9595*** 0.4392*** 0.2976*** 0.6814*** 0.8223*** 0.6974*** 0.7673*** -0.0368
(0.067) (0.047) (0.060) (0.045) (0.056) (0.052) (0.050) (0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.063) (0.062)
Constant -0.1962 0.4223*** -0.9879*** 0.2509** -2.0871*** -6.7804*** 2.8389*** 0.6596*** -0.0260 -0.3084** -2.1902*** -8.4569***
(0.174) (0.119) (0.157) (0.115) (0.149) (0.170) (0.117) (0.141) (0.143) (0.135) (0.161) (0.192)
Observations
Urban Rural
Male
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
96,237 138,465
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Annexure 7 – Multinomial Logit for Employment Sector: Female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES primary
manufact
uring
constructi
on
comm-
erce
transporta
tion and 
finance public primary
manufact
uring
constructi
on
comm-
erce
transporta
tion and 
finance public
Age -0.1380*** 0.0071 0.0481 -0.0016 -0.0080 0.2597*** -0.0771*** -0.0456** 0.0447 0.0563* 0.0592 0.3614***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.095) (0.029) (0.065) (0.024) (0.017) (0.020) (0.070) (0.031) (0.098) (0.035)
Age squared 0.0016*** -0.0006** -0.0020 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0029*** 0.0007*** -0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0007* -0.0014 -0.0044***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Less than -0.6273* 1.0849*** 1.0122* 1.0833*** 2.1094*** 1.4000*** -0.1385 0.4633 -0.0806 0.0220 -2.5243 0.8421
primary (0.337) (0.235) (0.598) (0.348) (0.807) (0.347) (0.278) (0.290) (0.764) (0.491) (4.304) (0.788)
Primary -0.3408** 1.0394*** -0.1124 0.8650*** 1.6213*** 0.6439*** -0.4239*** 0.3279** 0.3817 0.7024*** 0.8895* 1.6462***
(0.142) (0.109) (0.417) (0.178) (0.497) (0.219) (0.131) (0.139) (0.313) (0.187) (0.469) (0.284)
Lower -2.2413*** -0.1120 -0.7335** 0.1324 1.4375*** 2.1301*** -2.0556*** -1.2552*** -0.9776*** -0.4236** 0.2022 4.0137***
Secondary (0.150) (0.075) (0.308) (0.137) (0.386) (0.109) (0.095) (0.109) (0.323) (0.175) (0.397) (0.170)
Pre-University -4.6717*** -2.6341*** -2.3712*** -1.3961*** 1.6651*** 2.2155*** -4.8681*** -4.0746*** -3.0242*** -2.9159*** -1.9852*** 3.4411***
and above (0.292) (0.096) (0.396) (0.156) (0.344) (0.098) (0.131) (0.203) (0.619) (0.382) (0.695) (0.172)
Sindh -0.3249*** -0.1842*** -0.2089 0.1419 0.5404*** 0.0261 1.5613*** -0.2074 1.6911*** 0.2184 1.6131** 2.2354***
(0.099) (0.071) (0.304) (0.122) (0.188) (0.074) (0.202) (0.232) (0.360) (0.318) (0.638) (0.244)
NWFP -0.1027 -0.3633** 0.2289 0.3835 0.3505 0.9751*** -0.0712 -0.5648*** 0.6794** -1.0381*** 1.1739*** 1.2468***
(0.204) (0.161) (0.541) (0.240) (0.416) (0.134) (0.103) (0.124) (0.287) (0.255) (0.385) (0.131)
Balochistan 1.2495*** -0.7925** 1.0337 1.0290** 0.4544 1.9948*** 1.6971*** 1.2181** 2.4672*** 1.4599** 3.0942*** 3.3482***
(0.319) (0.396) (0.766) (0.429) (0.992) (0.282) (0.536) (0.555) (0.728) (0.640) (0.902) (0.584)
Married 1.2388*** 0.0476 0.4235 0.3132** 0.3189 0.8282*** 1.1416*** 0.2764*** 0.6980** 0.6877*** -0.4671 0.7397***
(0.101) (0.074) (0.317) (0.128) (0.234) (0.078) (0.081) (0.092) (0.277) (0.148) (0.415) (0.120)
year 2002 0.1669 0.3746*** -0.3788 -0.3238 -0.9234* -0.2058* 0.1131 0.5337*** 0.3567 -0.1501 0.8133 0.0789
(0.159) (0.113) (0.541) (0.201) (0.516) (0.121) (0.135) (0.161) (0.468) (0.229) (0.596) (0.203)
year 2004 0.6751*** 0.4697*** -0.0420 -0.3687* -0.6063 -0.5331*** -0.0095 0.5725*** 0.1073 -0.2886 -1.0166 -0.1911
(0.151) (0.111) (0.492) (0.198) (0.441) (0.120) (0.125) (0.151) (0.453) (0.214) (0.788) (0.197)
year 2007 1.0160*** 0.4473*** 0.7557* 0.2358 0.3161 -0.4403*** 0.2429** 0.6284*** 0.7422* 0.1426 -0.1135 -0.5075***
(0.147) (0.111) (0.433) (0.179) (0.373) (0.118) (0.123) (0.148) (0.410) (0.198) (0.624) (0.192)
year 2008 0.9735*** 0.6314*** -0.0811 0.2731 0.6543* -0.3696*** 0.2986** 0.7521*** 0.3885 0.0792 0.0945 -0.4643**
(0.151) (0.113) (0.517) (0.183) (0.368) (0.123) (0.123) (0.148) (0.424) (0.202) (0.604) (0.190)
year 2009 0.9481*** 0.6156*** 0.9825** -0.0135 0.7701** -0.2800** 0.4349*** 0.9044*** 0.3690 0.0972 -0.6205 -0.7011***
(0.147) (0.109) (0.418) (0.185) (0.355) (0.116) (0.124) (0.149) (0.430) (0.205) (0.691) (0.192)
Constant 1.2390*** 0.3964 -2.9912** -1.9381*** -4.6968*** -7.5084*** 4.3306*** 2.1495*** -2.6026** -2.0731*** -3.6210** -9.7807***
(0.342) (0.283) (1.338) (0.492) (1.080) (0.416) (0.306) (0.349) (1.082) (0.546) (1.578) (0.599)
Observations
RuralUrban
Female
35,136
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
10,209
Labor Market Policies Under a Youth Bulge 
53 
 
 
Annexure 8 – Probit for Formal Sector Employment 
 
 
 
Notes: Probit regression is estimated separately by gender and region. Omitted variables include ‘no education 
group’, ‘Punjab province’, ‘non-married’, and ‘year 2000’. The numbers represent the marginal effects with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Urban Rural Urban Rural
Age 0.0257*** 0.0124*** 0.0265*** 0.0010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age squared -0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than 0.0254*** 0.0355*** 0.1554*** 0.0049***
primary (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Primary 0.0333*** 0.0460*** 0.0292*** 0.0150***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Lower 0.1267*** 0.1288*** 0.4093*** 0.3586***
Secondary (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Pre-University 0.5508*** 0.6687*** 0.6366*** 0.7365***
and above (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sindh 0.0025*** 0.0188*** -0.0130*** 0.0047***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NWFP 0.0605*** 0.0355*** 0.1196*** 0.0076***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Balochistan 0.1703*** 0.0818*** 0.2145*** 0.0140***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Married 0.0325*** 0.0077*** 0.0966*** 0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2002 -0.0005*** 0.0017*** -0.0347*** -0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
year 2004 -0.0217*** -0.0031*** -0.0697*** -0.0006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2007 -0.0163*** -0.0065*** -0.0752*** -0.0015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
year 2008 -0.0113*** -0.0029*** -0.0334*** -0.0010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
year 2009 -0.0211*** -0.0102*** -0.0615*** -0.0021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R squared 0.286 0.345 0.347 0.600
Male Female
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Labor Market Policies Under a Youth Bulge 
54 
 
 
Annexure 9 – Summary of Policy Issues and Recommendations  
 
 
 Issues Recommendations 
Short term 
(Immediate 
interventions 
needed)  
 Large unskilled stock of workforce 
 Disadvantaged group-youth and 
women 
 Unemployed workforce 
 Entrepreneurial support for productive self 
employment 
o Microcredit/microfinance/grants 
o Entrepreneurial skills training 
o Mentoring/counseling/consulting 
o Microfranchising 
   Targeted ALMPs 
o Technical and vocational skills training 
o Job search assistance/counseling 
o Employment intermediation/internship 
 Public Works 
Medium term 
(Gradual 
reform needed) 
 Low education/skills of population   Reform in education and TVET system 
o Governance and accountability 
o Private sector involvement 
o Financing and payment 
Long term 
(Careful 
planning 
needed) 
 High informality and little access to 
worker protection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Need for creation and expansion of 
business and establishments 
 Hiring and dismissal procedures 
o Balance between flexibility and security 
o Prioritization of core standards 
 Minimum wage 
o Establishment of minimum wage setting 
mechanism 
 Social Insurance 
o Expansion of coverage 
o Financial sustainability 
 Macroeconomic and Regulatory Environment  
o Macroeconomic stability 
o Infrastructure and business environment 
 Education 
o Expansion of opportunities 
o Improvement in quality 
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Annexure 10 – Snapshot of ALMPs in Pakistan  
 
Name of 
Program 
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
Finances/Budget/Expenses 
Per 
beneficiary 
cost
95
 
Number of Regional 
Offices 
Bureau of 
Emigration and 
Overseas 
Employment 
403,528 N/A N/A 4 
People Works 
Program 
227,734 Rs. 7,977,387,293 Rs. 35,029 N/A 
NRSP 2,922,943 Rs. 660,269,925 Rs. 226
96
 38 
PRSP 
81,754 
Rs. 318,505,151 
 
Rs. 3,896 6 
Khushali Bank 284,000 Rs. 752,725,112 Rs. 2,650. 113 
Kashf 
Foundation 
319,153 
Rs. 2,000,972,725 
 
Rs. 6,270 
 
5 
BRSP 14,392 Rs. 159,941,400 Rs. 11,113 12 
Sindh RSP 8,577 N/A N/A 15 
Sarhad RSP 1,200,000 Rs. 1,000,000,000 Rs. 833 4 
BBSYDP 40,000 Rs. 2,500,000 Rs. 62.5 15 
Sindh TEVTA 3,210
97
 Rs. 500 million N/A 5 
Punjab TEVTA 541
98
 Rs. 5.32 billion N/A 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95 Note that these calculations are unlikely to be very accurate. Due to the lack of information on the expenditures 
of the program, we assume that the budget allocations were expended during the financial year. 
96 This is also an exaggerated number as the budget pertains to all of NRSP’s programs while the beneficiary 
figures are only for its microcredit and training programs.  
97 These are only trainees enrolled in courses for which eligibility requirement is literacy.  
98 Same as above 
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Annexure 11 – Labor Regulations on Dismissal Policy Across Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulation EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSA Pakistan
Forbidding fixed term contracts for 
permanent activities
0.2 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.0
Maximum lengths of fixed term 
contract (months) 
44.0 46.9 28.8 33.6 24.0 38.2 9.0
Workers with less than 9 months 
tenure
1.8 6.8 2.9 2.2 0.3 2.1 3.2
Workers with 1 year tenure 3.5 7.3 3.8 2.7 3.3 3.3 4.3
Workers with 5 year tenure 13.2 10.1 14.7 8.9 12.4 12.9 21.4
Workers with 10 year tenure 24.7 13.5 26.3 17.6 23.4 26.1 42.9
Workers with 20 year tenure 45.1 19.7 48.2 35.9 42.4 59.0 85.7
Workers with less than 9 months 
tenure
2.6 5.6 1.5 3.6 3.2 4.5 4.3
Workers with 1 year tenure 2.6 5.6 2.1 4.3 4.5 4.9 4.3
Workers with 5 year tenure 3.4 6.0 3.0 5.1 5.1 6.0 4.3
Workers with 10 year tenure 3.6 6.2 3.6 5.9 6.0 6.8 4.3
Workers with 20 year tenure 3.6 6.2 4.1 5.9 6.0 7.6 4.3
Notifying third party required? (Yes- 1 and No- 0, region average)
Any dismissal 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0
Dismissal of 9+ workers 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.0
Source: Doing Business 2011.
Note: Severance pay, notice period, and paid annual leave figures respresent average of workers with 1, 5, and 10 years of job seniority. Sri 
Severance pay for redundancy dismissal      (in salary weeks)
Notice period for redundancy dismissal      (in salary weeks)
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Annexure 12 – Labor Regulation among Lower Middle Income Countries 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from the data for worker protection measures. The numbers in the table represent an 
aggregate index of each country in sections 'worker protection’, 'social security’, 'health and safety' and 'gender and 
personal needs', ranging from 0 (no specified protection measure) to 1 (all protection measures being specified in law). 
For each category, overall 176 countries, we calculated mean and standard deviation (SD). Each country is color coded 
to represent the extent of worker protection with Red meaning that the country's index is lower than 1 SD below the 
mean, Green meaning higher index by at least 1 SD above the mean, and Yellow being between them. Only the LMIC 
countries are presented here.  
 
 
 
 
 
Country Region Income
Worker 
Protection
Social Security
Health and 
Safety
Gender and 
Personal Needs
Armenia Europe & Central Asia Low er middle income 0.73 0.56 1.00 0.60
Belize Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.62 0.44 0.00 0.27
Bhutan South Asia Low er middle income 0.62 0.38 0.33 0.27
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.83 0.67 0.67 0.45
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.40 0.22 1.00 0.64
Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.62 0.67 0.00 0.55
Congo, Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.56 0.33 0.00 0.36
Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.58 0.44 0.00 0.64
Egypt, Arab Rep.Middle East & North Africa Low er middle income 0.92 0.75 0.67 0.45
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.69 0.56 0.33 0.45
Georgia Europe & Central Asia Low er middle income 0.69 0.22 0.33 0.50
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.85 0.44 0.67 0.36
Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.77 0.44 0.00 0.55
Guyana Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.62 0.44 0.00 0.27
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.54 0.71 0.33 0.55
India South Asia Low er middle income 1.00 0.78 0.33 0.45
Indonesia East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.55
Iraq Middle East & North Africa Low er middle income 0.85 0.33 0.00 0.36
Kiribati East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.46 0.25 0.00 0.55
Kosovo Europe & Central Asia Low er middle income 0.69 0.29 1.00 0.90
Lao PDR East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.77 0.78 1.00 0.45
Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.27 0.11 0.33 0.36
Marshall IslandsEast Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.08 0.43 0.00 0.09
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.62 0.44 0.50 0.45
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.10 0.78 0.00 0.09
Moldova Europe & Central Asia Low er middle income 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.70
Mongolia East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.45
Morocco Middle East & North Africa Low er middle income 0.69 0.56 0.33 0.64
Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.69 0.50 0.67 0.55
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.62 0.33 0.33 0.36
Pakistan South Asia Low er middle income 0.40 0.50 0.67 0.27
Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean Low er middle income 0.62 0.44 0.33 0.73
Philippines East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.75 0.67 0.67 0.55
São Tomé and PrincipeSub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.77 0.33 0.00 0.67
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.58 0.38 0.67 0.55
Solomon IslandsEast Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.09 0.44 1.00 0.27
Sri Lanka South Asia Low er middle income 0.69 0.44 0.33 0.27
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.20 0.56 0.67 0.36
Sw aziland Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.31 0.56 0.33 0.55
Syrian Arab RepublicMiddle East & North Africa Low er middle income 0.75 0.50 0.33 0.45
Timor-Leste East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.62 0.33 0.33 0.64
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia Low er middle income 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.67
Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia Low er middle income 0.92 0.78 1.00 0.60
Vietnam East Asia & Pacif ic Low er middle income 0.92 1.00 0.45
West Bank and GazaMiddle East & North Africa Low er middle income 0.62 0.00 0.67 0.36
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa Low er middle income 0.08 0.44 1.00 0.27
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Annexure 13 – Minimum Wage as a Percentage of Average Value Added by 
Income Level99 
 
 
Source: Doing Business 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
99 Countries with minimum wage higher than 100% of value added by an average worker or with no information 
were dropped. Dropped countries for high minimum wage include Liberia (2.11), Zimbabwe (1.8), Mozambique 
(1.01). Countries with no information on minimum wage include Republic of Congo (2.46), and Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Ginea, Afghanistan, Eirtrea, Maldives, Kiribati, Nigeria, Tonga, Djibouti, Cape Verde, Cote 
d’Ivore, Marshall Islands, Malaysia, Chile, Namibia, and Suriname. 
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Annexure 14 – Proportion of Workers below Minimum Wage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector All Regular Formal No education
Formal & No 
Education
Agriculture 72.7% 75.5% - 76.5% -
Manufacturing 49.7% 41.0% 39.0% 61.2% -
Construction 51.1% 32.3% - 54.8% -
Commerce 61.8% 61.7% 25.0% 64.3% -
Transportation and Finance 35.3% 32.1% 16.8% 43.9% -
Public 12.2% 11.1% 11.3% 25.0% 20.3%
Other service 67.6% 68.7% 47.4% 78.8% -
Note: Author's  ca lculation based on LFS 09. Miss ing entry in case of few observations  less  than 10.
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Annexure 15 – Kernel Density Graphs of Wage Distribution by Sector 
 
 
 
Source: based on LFS 2008/09.  
Note: The red vertical line indicates the level of minimum wage. The graphs were generated among all wage and 
salary workers in each sector. 
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